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INTRODUCTION 
On December 16, 1974, Judge Marvin Frankel told an audience 
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York that “our 
adversary system rates truth too low among the values that institutions 
of justice are meant to serve.”1  The judge had become frustrated with 
the “trickery and obfuscation”2 that he had witnessed during his nine 
years on the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.  He suggested that the adversary ideal should be modified 
to make truth “the paramount objective.”3  To implement this 
suggestion, Frankel proposed tentative amendments to the American 
Bar Association’s (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Frankel’s amendments4 would have required a lawyer to (1) 
disclose all relevant evidence and prospective witnesses, even when 
the lawyer does not intend to offer that evidence and those witnesses; 
(2) prevent or report any untrue statement by a client or witness, or 
 
 ∗ J.D. 2004, Yale Law School.  Law clerk to the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan, 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.  The author owes 
a great debt to Professor John H. Langbein of Yale Law School for his support and 
encouragement, his careful comments on drafts, and for posing the question that led 
to this Article.  The author is also extremely indebted to retired New Jersey Supreme 
Court Justice Stewart G. Pollock and to a number of other New Jersey attorneys who 
generously took the time to share their perspectives on various aspects of ethics and 
practice, including Christopher DeFalco, John R. Holsinger, and Albert B. Jeffers.  
The author also benefited greatly from conversations with Professor Stephen Gillers 
and Kevin H. Michels in which they generously shared their expertise in legal ethics.  
Finally, the author wishes to thank Isabel Frank for the kind favor of providing 
decisions of New Jersey’s Disciplinary Review Board. 
 1 The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1975) 
(31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, 
Dec. 16, 1974) [hereinafter The Search for Truth]. 
 2 Id. at 1059. 
 3 Id. at 1055. 
 4 See the Appendix for the full text of Frankel’s proposal. 
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any omission of material fact, that makes other statements 
misleading;5 and (3) at trial, examine witnesses “with a purpose and 
design to elicit the whole truth, including particularly supplementary 
and qualifying matters that render evidence already given more 
accurate, intelligible, or fair than it otherwise would be.”6 
Frankel was not the first person to address the tension between a 
lawyer’s duty to the client and to the court.7  Nonetheless, his views 
became such an important reference point in modern debate over 
the adversary system that in 1996, the article version of his speech was 
ranked the seventy-sixth most cited law review article of all time.8  
Marvin Frankel, who died on March 3, 2002,9 came to epitomize 
concern with the value of truth in the legal system and was for a time 
the country’s most prominent critic of the adversary system.10 
This Article explores the influence of Frankel’s proposals both 
on discourse about the legal system as well as on actual legal practice.  
In the academy, as Part I of this Article will show, Frankel’s specific 
proposals never gained wide acceptance.  The most heated debate 
concerning the duty of candor11 has involved the question of whether 
 
 5 Frankel borrowed this language from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), which is quoted in the 
Appendix of this Article, infra note 272. 
 6 The Search for Truth, supra note 1, at 1057–58. 
 7 For an overview of the pre-Frankel debates, see 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. 
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, pt. III, at p. 26-6 (3d ed. 2001); A. Kenneth 
Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921, 922–23. 
 8 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
751, 767 (1996).  The ranking may actually underestimate the number of citations to 
Frankel’s ideas because some authors may have cited only Partisan Justice, the 1980 
book Frankel published that includes some of the same ideas as The Search for Truth.  
See id. at 762.  On the other hand, Shapiro’s study is not a perfect measure of 
intellectual influence: “[A]n article might summarize a particular idea or issue 
effectively so that it becomes a convenient or reflexive cite long after it has ceased to 
influence scholars or even to be read.”  Id. at 754. 
 9 Steven Greenhouse, Marvin Frankel, Federal Judge and Pioneer of Sentencing 
Guidelines, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at C15. 
 10 See, e.g., 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 29.22, at p. 29-39 (“The most 
unqualified defense of truth as the paramount goal is associated with Judge Marvin 
Frankel.”). 
 11 This Article uses “duty of candor” to refer to the lawyer’s duty of candor to the 
court with respect to facts.  It would also be possible to study the lawyer’s duty of 
candor to the court with respect to the law.  See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on 
Zealous Representation in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 724–26 
(1997); Monroe H. Freedman, Arguing the Law in an Adversary System, 16 GA. L. REV. 
833 (1982); Angela Gilmore, Self-Inflicted Wounds: The Duty to Disclose Damaging Legal 
Authority, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303 (1995); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Arguing the Law: 
The Advocate’s Duty and Opportunity, 16 GA. L. REV. 821 (1982).  However, this duty is 
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a criminal defense lawyer has a duty to disclose a client’s perjury or 
other wrongdoing.12  Frankel’s proposals were far more radical than 
the already controversial requirement that a lawyer should inform the 
court of his client’s wrongdoing, and his proposals were 
overshadowed by discussion of that more conservative proposal.13  
Frankel, however, succeeded in one respect.  His specific proposals 
were meant to be tentative;14 his larger purpose was to inspire the 
legal profession to talk more about the value of truth in an adversary 
system and about ways to promote that value.  In this he succeeded, at 
least in the academy. 
He was less successful in producing change in adversarial 
practice.  As Part II will show, even though Frankel was a member of 
the commission that drafted the American Bar Association’s 1983 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and early drafts of the Rules 
essentially reflected his position, his views were gradually washed out 
of successive drafts until, with minor exceptions, the final version 
contained no trace of them.15 
Part III will demonstrate, however, that a disclosure requirement 
similar to that proposed by Frankel landed in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct that New Jersey adopted in 1984.16  Until now, 
New Jersey’s extraordinary rule has not been literally enforced.  
Nonetheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court and New Jersey’s 
disciplinary bodies appear to have become increasingly interested in 
recent years in using the rule to remind lawyers about the importance 
of candor.  In a case decided in June 2004, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court presented its most extensive discussion of the rule to date and, 
for the first time ever, cited the very Frankel proposal that appears to 
be the rule’s ancestor.17  Thirty years after the publication of Frankel’s 
article, this development raises the possibility that attorneys 
practicing in New Jersey will be held to a noticeably higher standard 
 
not as closely connected with the truth-seeking function of a trial.  See, e.g., John H. 
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985) 
(noting that what distinguishes the Continental system from the American adversary 
system is the lawyer’s role in fact-gathering, not in developing legal theories).  For 
the sake of putting reasonable boundaries on the scope of this Article, therefore, I 
will discuss only the duty of candor to the court with respect to facts. 
 12 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 13 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 14 The Search for Truth, supra note 1, at 1031. 
 15 See infra Part II. 
 16 N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(5) (1984). 
 17 See In re Seelig, 180 N.J. 234, 850 A.2d 477 (2004). 
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of candor than attorneys practicing in other jurisdictions. 
The final section of this Article draws lessons from the 
experience of New Jersey and concludes that Frankel-type reforms 
are unlikely to succeed without pervasive changes in the attitudes and 
habits of the legal profession.18 
Frankel’s ideas appear also to be at least partly responsible for 
another development, but it is one beyond the scope of this Article.  
In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were amended 
to allow district courts to opt in to a regime requiring pretrial 
disclosure of all material that each party plans to use in support of its 
own claims and defenses.19  In 2000, the FRCP were amended again to 
make that regime mandatory.20  These amendments are traceable to 
the ideas expressed in two law review articles written by Wayne Brazil 
and William Schwarzer respectively,21 who were both clearly 
influenced by Frankel.22 
While these amendments to the FRCP help to reduce the 
adversarial character of civil discovery, they do not actually make 
lawyers responsible for the truth.  The amended rules merely require 
that a party disclose what the adversary would ultimately learn 
anyway—namely, how the party intends to support its own claims and 
defenses.  The rule does not impose, as Frankel’s proposals would 
have, an affirmative obligation to disclose unfavorable material.23  
 
 18 See infra pp. 51–54. 
 19 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (1993) (amended 2000). 
 20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
 21 The Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1993 amendments to the FRCP 
specifically state that “[t]he concepts of imposing a duty of disclosure were set forth 
in” Wayne Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for 
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1348 (1978) and William Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the 
Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 721–23 (1989).  See also 
Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush To Reform, 27 GA. L. 
REV. 1, 15–17 (1992).  Brazil eventually became a member of the Advisory 
Committee that proposed the 1993 rule.  Id. at 17. 
 22 Brazil’s entire article, supra note 21, is framed as a response to Frankel, and 
Schwarzer’s article was also influenced by Frankel’s ideas.  See Schwarzer, supra note 
21, at 722 & n.58. 
 23 Arizona and Nevada do impose such an obligation, but a lawyer in these states 
only needs to make unfavorable disclosures to opposing counsel; there is no 
affirmative duty of candor with respect to the court.  Arizona requires attorneys to 
disclose “[t]he names and addresses of all persons whom the party believes may have 
knowledge or information relevant to the . . . action, and the nature of the 
knowledge or information each such individual is believed to possess.”  ARIZ. R. CIV. 
P. 26.1(a)(4).  Arizona also requires attorneys to produce “[a] list of the 
documents . . . known by a party to exist whether or not in the party’s possession, 
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Because these discovery rules do not impose such a duty, and the 
subject of pretrial disclosure has been extensively treated elsewhere,24 
this Article does not specifically discuss this topic.  Of course, 
discovery battles are a major aspect of the adversary character of civil 
lawsuits, but the discussion in this Article is limited to ethics 
standards. 
I. WRESTLING WITH TRUTH IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 
A.  The Major Arguments 
In 1966, Monroe Freedman published a famous article in which 
he argued that a criminal defense lawyer has a duty to (1) destroy a 
witness “whom you know to be telling the truth”; (2) “put a witness 
on the stand when you know he will commit perjury”; and (3) “give 
your client legal advice when you have reason to believe that the 
knowledge you give him will tempt him to commit perjury.”25  
Freedman’s article and the speech on which it was based26—which 
prompted then-Judge Warren Burger to suggest disbarring him27—
triggered his career in legal ethics, and he eventually became the 
country’s most prominent academic champion of adversary values.28 
Since Freedman’s article, much of the literature on the duty of 
candor in the adversary system—indeed, the literature on the 
adversary system itself—has focused on the question of whether a 
 
custody or control and which that party believes may be relevant to the subject 
matter of the action.”  ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(9).  Nevada requires attorneys in 
pretrial discovery to “[e]xchange written lists of persons . . . believed to have 
knowledge of any facts relevant to the allegations of any pleading filed by any party to 
the action . . . .”  NEV. R. CIV. P. 16.1(b)(5) (emphasis added). 
 24 See, e.g., Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(a)—’Much Ado About Nothing?’, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (1995); Bell et al., supra note 
21. 
 25 Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: 
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966). 
 26 See id.; Ronald D. Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 622, 622 n.3 (1976) 
(reviewing MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975)). 
 26 The speech was given to a small audience of the District of Columbia Bar 
Association.  Freedman, supra note 25, at 1469 n.1. 
 27 See id.; MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM viii 
(1975). 
 28 See, e.g., 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 29.22, at p. 29-39 (“The most 
unqualified defense of loyalty to client interests is associated with Professor Monroe 
Freedman.”). 
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lawyer has a duty to disclose his client’s perjury29 and on the related 
issue of the extent of a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality to his client.30  
Many of the articles on the perjury dilemma and the duty of 
confidentiality briefly cite Frankel’s The Search for Truth (and his book 
Partisan Justice,31 which grew out of the article) for the proposition 
that adversary combat may not be the most effective means of arriving 
at the truth.32  Indeed, the tension between the lawyer’s duty of 
confidentiality to the client and the lawyer’s duty of candor to the 
court came to be known as the Freedman–Frankel debate.33  Very few 
of these articles, however, advocate implementing Frankel’s proposals 
or seriously address the issue of a lawyer’s responsibility for truth in 
an adversarial system.34 
Reflecting on this phenomenon two decades after the 
publication of The Search for Truth, Frankel told an ethics symposium 
audience that Freedman’s three propositions, notwithstanding the 
controversy they had inspired, “are really either moot or immaterial.  
They have served as substitutes for, or diversions from, a broader and 
more fundamental question, namely, whether 
 . . . criminal lawyers, supposedly to defend the rights of the innocent, 
should routinely [thwart] the search for truth . . . .”35  Frankel pointed 
 
 29 See, e.g., 2 id.: 
The client perjury problem . . . puts the dilemma of the adversary 
system into sharp focus, for it is in this context that the clash between 
the truth-seeking function and the interests of clients becomes most 
intense.  Much of the literature about the perjury problem is also 
literature about the role of lawyers in the adversary system, and vice 
versa.  The vast literature about the confidentiality rule likewise 
intersects both of these issues. 
 30 See 1 id. § 9.3, at pp. 9-10 to 9-14.  For lists of some of the articles that appeared 
at around the same time as The Search for Truth, see 1 id. § 9.3, at pp. 9-10 to 9-13; 2 id. 
§ 29.22, at pp. 29-39 to 29-40; Pye, supra note 7, at 924 n.17. 
 31 MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980). 
 32 See, e.g., R.W. Nahstoll, The Lawyer’s Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality, 
41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 421, 439 n.17 (1984); Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, 
The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing Prospective Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
935, 949 (2002); Charles W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 810–11 
n.7 (1977); Ronald Evan Alper, Comment, Proposed Client Perjury: A Criminal Defense 
Attorney’s Alternatives, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 248, 249 n.9 (1983). 
 33 See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 29.22, at p. 29-40; see also Crystal, supra 
note 11, at 711. 
 34 See generally sources cited supra note 32.  One article in this area that does 
obliquely address the lawyer’s responsibility for truth is Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The 
Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1041 (1997). 
 35 Marvin E. Frankel, Clients’ Perjury and Lawyers’ Options, 1 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL 
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out that Freedman had later repudiated his third proposition (that a 
lawyer has a duty to give legal advice that may help the client to 
commit perjury),36 and that Freedman’s second proposition (that a 
lawyer has a duty to put an untruthful witness on the stand) has been 
generally rejected.37  Furthermore, Frankel argued, in real life a 
lawyer rarely has to decide whether to present untruthful testimony.  
The client-perjury problem is therefore mostly an academic one.  The 
larger problem for Frankel was what to do about the various 
techniques that defense lawyers routinely use to conceal and distort 
the truth.38 
In reality, Frankel probably made a mistake when he said that all 
three of Freedman’s propositions are moot.  If Frankel was correct 
that a defense lawyer rarely must decide between assisting perjury and 
betraying the client, whereas they do routinely use an arsenal of tricks 
to subvert the truth, then Freedman’s first proposition—that a lawyer 
has a duty to discredit a truthful witness—should still be relevant.  
And yet, that issue has provoked far less discussion than the client 
perjury question. 
The most notable article to address the discrediting of truthful 
witnesses came from Harry Subin in 1987.39  Subin agreed with 
Frankel’s critique of the adversary system and of criminal defense 
lawyers’ techniques for subverting truth, especially the use of cross-
examination to discredit witnesses whom the lawyer knows to be 
telling the truth.40  A former criminal defense attorney, Subin 
attempted to refute Freedman’s views with some care.41  Subin did not 
 
ETHICS 25, 26 (1996). 
 36 Id. at 27 (citing FREEDMAN, supra note 27, at 59–76). 
 37 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility do not countenance the presentation of perjurious testimony.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), (7) (1981). 
 38 Frankel, Clients’ Perjury and Lawyers’ Options, supra note 35, at 28–29, 37. 
 39 Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: Reflections on the “Right” 
to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987).  For another consideration 
of defense tactics, including undermining truthful witnesses, that appeared at about 
the same time, see Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False 
Look True, 41 SW. L.J. 1135 (1988).  Schwartz argues that Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 
(1986)—with Chief Justice Burger’s description of “the very nature of a trial as a 
search for truth,” id. at 166—suggests that defense tactics that make false statements 
or testimony look true and true statements or testimony look false are “highly 
suspect, if not clearly improper.” Schwartz, supra, at 1138. 
 40 Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”, supra note 39, at 128, 135–36. 
 41 Id. at 129–49. 
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directly discuss Frankel’s proposals; instead, he made his own.  Subin 
suggested a rule that would prohibit a criminal defense attorney who 
knows the truth of a fact in the state’s case from “attempt[ing] to 
refute that fact through the introduction of evidence, impeachment 
of evidence, or argument.”42  This proposed rule differs from 
Frankel’s original proposals in that it does not impose a duty to (1) 
disclose material information; (2) refrain from presenting misleading 
statements; or (3) elicit the whole truth from witnesses.  That is, the 
Subin rule merely prohibits making the true look false; it does not 
prohibit making the false look true. 
Subin’s article, which provoked a thoughtful response by John 
Mitchell43 and a rejoinder by Subin himself ,44 has proved, like The 
Search for Truth, to be influential for its general critique rather than 
for its specific proposal.45  One of the few people who supported 
Subin’s proposed rule was Frankel.  In the 1996 presentation 
excerpted above, Frankel did not mention his own proposals of two 
decades earlier, but he concluded that Subin’s rule would be the best 
one for the adversary system as we know it today.46 
Murray L. Schwartz has pointed out that the standard 
justifications of truth-defeating tactics “appeal to the role of the 
defense attorney in a criminal trial.”47  These rationales do not apply 
to the civil trial, because, Schwartz argued, the paramount purpose of 
 
 42 Id.  at 149. 
 43 John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to 
Professor Subin’s Position on the Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 339 (1987); see also infra note 62. 
 44 Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a 
False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689 (1987). 
 45 See, e.g., W. William Hodes, The Lawyers: Lord Brougham, the Dream Team, and Jury 
Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075, 1085 n.26 (1996); David 
Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer–Client Relationship: A Reply to 
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1027 & n.87 (1990); Eleanor W. Myers & 
Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discrediting the Truthful Witness: Demonstrating the Reality of 
Adversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1055, 1062 (2000); W. Bradley Wendel, Civil 
Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 371 & n.37 (2004); see also Frankel, Clients’ Perjury 
and Lawyers’ Options, supra note 35, at 27 (“[E]ight whole years after the way was 
lighted, we seem no closer to accepting Professor Subin’s sound conclusion than we 
were when he stated it.  The notion that criminal defense lawyers, of all people, owe 
a duty not to obstruct the search for the truth remains a heresy, both in theory and 
in practice.”). 
 46 Frankel, Clients’ Perjury and Lawyers’ Options, supra note 35, at 26. 
 47 See Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD 
LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 150, 157 (1983) [hereinafter THE 
GOOD LAWYER]. 
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a civil trial is to accurately reconstruct what happened, not to avoid 
error in one direction.  Schwartz contended that civil litigators 
should therefore be governed by rules that are more truth-serving 
and that Frankel’s proposal would be “[a] good start in that 
direction.”48 
Aside from these contributions, a large number of articles have 
debated, often with reference to Frankel’s publications, the merits of 
the American adversary system and whether it does enough to 
promote truth.49  Most of those critics, however, focus only on 
criminal justice, and few have engaged Frankel’s proposal.50 
B.  Debating Frankel’s Proposal 
Writers who have seriously engaged Frankel’s proposals have 
argued that (1) in an adversary system, other values take precedence 
over truth; (2) an adversary process designed to reach the truth 
necessarily sometimes obscures truth; (3) Frankel’s proposals would 
weaken the attorney–client relationship and discourage effective 
representation; and (4) Frankel’s proposals are impracticable. 
One strand of argument against Frankel’s proposals rejects the 
idea that truth should be accorded a higher priority in an adversary 
trial.  This position has been argued most forcefully by Monroe 
Freedman, but others have made similar points.51  Freedman, in a 
response that was published alongside Frankel’s article,52 argued that 
the American legal system serves other values, like the promotion of 
 
 48 Id. at 158–60. 
 49 See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on 
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469 (1992); The 
Honorable Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271 
(1987); Charles Pulaski, Jr., Criminal Trials: A “Search for Truth” or Something Else?, 16 
CRIM. L. BULL. 41 (1980); Jay Sterling Silver, Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on 
the Adversarial Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (1994); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary 
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1992). 
 50 See generally sources cited supra note 49. 
 51 See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 
MERCER L. REV. 647, 651 (1986) (arguing that the adversary system is not a search for 
truth, but rather “a competition to win” that is supposed to promote goals of 
substantive law).  For a penetrating explanation of what is wrong with Saltzburg’s 
account of the adversary system—namely, that Saltzburg is simply redefining theory 
so that it approximates practice, and that correctly applying substantive law depends 
on accurate fact-finding—see Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating 
the Place of Truth in the Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 799, 839–42. 
 52 Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 
(1975). 
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individual dignity, in addition to truth.  Serving individual dignity, 
Freedman contended, might sometimes require subordinating—and 
hence, distorting—truth.  One example is the constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination.53  Freedman quoted United States 
Supreme Court justices who have supported defense attorneys’ 
obligation to defend clients vigorously, regardless of whether they are 
guilty.54  None of the quoted passages explain why this duty exists or 
what makes it more important than truth, but Freedman offered the 
following explanation: “Before we will permit the state to deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, we require that certain processes 
which ensure regard for the dignity of the individual be followed, 
irrespective of their impact on the determination of truth.”55 
Freedman’s response to Frankel essentially ended there, 
although as a logical matter, his answer was not complete.  Freedman 
did not explain why dignity requires processes that distort the truth.  
That is, even if dignity is of paramount concern, and the only way to 
serve dignity is through process, it is not clear why that process must 
override the truth.  Freedman does not explain why dignity would be 
at risk under procedures designed to promote rather than 
subordinate truth. 
Others have completed this line of reasoning by arguing that an 
attorney’s loyalty has a value and that Frankel’s proposals would 
interfere with that loyalty by creating a duty to further the other side’s 
case.  For example, in Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System, Freedman 
argued56 that dignity requires the right to an advocate; that  an 
advocate can only be effective if the client confides in him; and that 
the client will not confide in the lawyer unless the lawyer can promise 
 
 53 Id. at 1063–65. 
 54 See, e.g., id. at 1064 (“‘[A]s part of the duty imposed on the most honorable 
defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in many instances has 
little, if any, relation to the search for truth.’”) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)).  
Freedman also quotes Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966): “‘[T]he lawyer in fulfilling his professional responsibilities of 
necessity may become an obstacle to truthfinding.’”  Freedman, supra note 52, at 
1064 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 514 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 55 Id.  at 1065. 
 56 FREEDMAN, supra note 27, at 4–8.  This book’s first chapter appears to have 
been the source of certain portions of Freedman’s response to Frankel.  Freedman 
actually presented a version of this argument in his 1966 article, Professional 
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, supra note 25, 
but a reference to the book is helpful because its text literally picks up where the 
response to Frankel left off. 
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absolute confidence.57  In addition, Albert Alschuler argued that 
Frankel’s proposals would divide the lawyer’s duty to his client—a 
duty that has non-instrumental value because it promotes a sense of 
fair treatment.58  Similarly, H. Richard Uviller, in a response 
published alongside Frankel’s article, worried that making lawyers 
responsible for the truth would create an “affirmative duty of 
betrayal.”59  Such a duty would violate the individualistic values 
embodied in criminal procedure.60 
A second strand of argument against the proposition that 
lawyers should be responsible for the truth is that an adversary system 
designed to arrive at the truth will sometimes obscure the truth.  
Uviller contended that defense counsel cannot necessarily know or 
recognize the truth and that Frankel “proceeds from the assumption 
that the shining Truth is known or knowable by all diligent lawyers 
acting in good faith.”61  According to Uviller, defense counsel might 
not know or recognize “the truth” because cases are tried not on “the 
truth,” but on evidence, which is rarely unambiguous.62  A defense 
 
 57 For an effective critique of this argument, see Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal 
Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 47, at 123, 144. 
 58 Albert Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client’s Confidences: One Value Among Many 
or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 350–55 (1981).  In response, 
Frankel asserted that the concept of a hallowed duty of loyalty is nothing more than a 
self-serving romantic vision.  He explained that the duty as it exists now really stems 
from an amoral commercial relationship.  To illustrate this point, Frankel pointed 
out that the duty of prosecutors to remain truthful overrides their loyalty to the 
complaining witness, towards whom they have a certain obligation and, typically, 
feelings of affinity.  The only significant difference, Frankel said, between a defense 
attorney and a prosecutor, is that the prosecutor is not being paid by the 
complaining witness.  The reality, argued Frankel, is that in letting confidentiality to 
the client trump the truth, the lawyer may be serving the client’s interest, but the 
lawyer is probably disserving someone else’s interest at the same time.  Frankel 
contended that an honest balancing of goods argues in favor of a duty to tell the 
truth.  Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 52 
U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 54–56, 61–62 (1982).  As for the problem of the prosecutor’s 
divided duty, Frankel used the example of fiduciaries—like corporate officers and 
directors—who have complex, divided duties: “[T]he learned professionals who 
formulated such difficult obligations are not incapable of simultaneously serving 
clients and not lying to courts.”  Id. at 62–63. 
 59 H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to 
Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1073–74 (1975). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 1077. 
 62 Id. at 1076–79; see also Mitchell, supra note 43, at 345 (responding to Subin’s 
proposal that a defense lawyer should not attempt to impeach facts that he knows are 
true by arguing that “in a trial there are no such things as facts.  There is only 
information, lack of information, and chains of inferences therefrom”). 
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should not be shaped by the defense lawyer’s personal evaluation of 
the true state of affairs, for it is not the defense lawyer’s job to 
evaluate credibility.63 
Even when a defense lawyer knows to a certainty which facts are 
true and which are not, there is still an interest, Uviller suggests, in 
holding the state to its burden of proof.  The adversary system is 
designed to prevent the conviction of innocent persons at the 
expense of acquitting some guilty ones.  This goal is served by having 
a defense lawyer relentlessly challenge the state’s case, even when the 
defense lawyer knows that the case has merit.64 
Uviller also argued that there is a difference between “ultimate 
and . . . instrumental facts.”65  He used the example of a lawyer 
defending a man whom the lawyer believes committed the robbery 
with which he is charged.  If the defense attorney believes that a 
witness’ testimony is false, “[a]ttacking that witness serves the 
instrumental truth but may defeat the ultimate truth.”66  A defender 
of Frankel’s proposition, according to Uviller, must choose between 
prohibiting truth-defeating tactics and allowing defense counsel to 
keep all evidence truthful.67  Uviller’s position, however, appears to be 
flawed.  Frankel did not claim that a lawyer must countenance 
untruthful means in the service of truthful ends.  Frankel’s proposal 
would not have prevented a lawyer from attacking a false witness, 
even if the result were to prevent the emergence of the ultimate 
truth. 
Another response to Frankel’s proposal was instrumental: 
Making lawyers affirmatively responsible for the truth would have 
undesirable side effects.  Albert Alschuler, for example, suggests that 
protecting confidentiality does not impair the search for truth 
because the purpose of confidentiality is to induce disclosures to the 
attorney that the client would not make (and therefore, no one 
would know) in the absence of the protection.  Under Frankel’s 
proposals, therefore, a client would refrain from revealing material 
 
 63 Uviller, supra note 59, at 1077. 
 64 Id. at 1078–79.  Mitchell made a similar point by arguing that because factual 
guilt is not at issue in a criminal trial, raising alternative possibilities and casting 
doubt on the prosecution’s case is not presenting a “false case,” but rather 
introducing “reasonable doubts.”  Mitchell, supra note 43, at 346. 
 65 Uviller, supra note 59, at 1077. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 1077–78. 
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adverse facts.68  Uviller argued that in the commercial context, 
impairing confidence might be undesirable because the lawyer often 
obtains complete disclosure from the client, and the lawyer can use 
the disclosures to steer the client away from unlawful activities.69  
William T. Pizzi has argued that if a lawyer were required to disclose 
adverse information, the lawyer might strategically avoid obtaining 
full knowledge.70  A defender of Frankel’s proposals might respond 
that under those proposals, a lawyer would be prohibited from 
avoiding full knowledge so as to be able to tell half-truths to the 
court. 
Finally, critics have argued that Frankel’s proposals are 
impracticable and that a lawyer simply could not function in the 
American system under the duties Frankel proposed.  Stephen 
Saltzburg, for example, argued that lawyers always emphasize and 
deemphasize facts to make their version of a case as persuasive as 
possible.  To require them to do otherwise—as Frankel’s duties not to 
make misleading statements and to elicit the whole truth when 
examining witnesses would have entailed—”simply would not work.”71  
Similarly, Pizzi has argued that the defects of the adversary system are 
 
 68 Alschuler, supra note 58, at 350, 352.  In response to this argument, Frankel 
asserted that not all clients want to lie or conceal the truth, and those that do want to 
lie or conceal the truth can do so without legal help.  However, Frankel wrote, 
untruthful clients will lie to their lawyers, as they often do anyway.  Finally, Frankel 
claimed that even if both lawyers and clients are such scoundrels that a duty to tell 
the truth will not result in more accurate fact-finding, at least such a duty will prevent 
lawyers from being accomplices to villainy.  Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued, 
supra note 58, at 57–59, 63. 
It is worth mentioning that neither Frankel, Freedman, nor Alschuler (or 
anyone else for that matter) had convincing answers to the fundamental question of 
whether empirically, confidentiality rules produce outcomes that are more or less 
accurate.  See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to 
Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1163 (1985).  The results of one limited 
empirical investigation suggest that Frankel had the better argument.  Fred C. 
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989); see also Leslie C. 
Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to 
Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81 (1994); cf. Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard 
Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice 
and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 315, 401–13 (1991) (proposing an analytical 
framework for determining the effect of confidentiality rules on information 
sharing). 
 69 Uviller, supra note 59, at 1072. 
 70 William T. Pizzi, Judge Frankel and the Adversary System, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 357, 
365 (1981).  Presumably, a lawyer might also be chilled from conducting additional 
investigations in search of evidence beneficial to the client because the investigations 
could turn up information that is damaging to the client. 
 71 Saltzburg, supra note 51, at 682. 
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not due to the ethical failings of lawyers, but rather inhere in the 
structure of the American trial.  Using ethical rules to curb excesses is 
unlikely to succeed because the incentives of the adversary system 
place great pressures on the rules of professional conduct.72  As for 
Frankel’s duty to disclose all relevant evidence, Saltzburg argued that 
a lawyer does not know his adversary’s strategy and therefore is not 
able to judge what is relevant in advance.73 
The arguments presented so far are the major ones the academy 
has leveled against Frankel’s proposals over the years.  The criticisms 
voiced by the bar when it was confronted with the actual possibility of 
having to abide by the Frankel proposals are discussed in Part II. 
C.  Frankel’s Proposal Today 
Frankel’s proposal is still standard reading in legal ethics 
textbooks,74 but almost no one seems to be seriously endorsing it.75  A 
 
 72 Pizzi, supra note 70, at 363–65.  Pizzi suggested that it would be more effective 
to change the structure of trials in ways that would blend elements of the continental 
trial procedure—for example, (1) letting judges control questioning of witnesses, 
with lawyers filling in gaps; (2) replacing opening and closing statements with an 
outline of the case from the bench; and (3) permitting witnesses to ask questions of 
each other.  Id. at 365–66.  Pizzi has adhered to the view that the defects of the 
American trial are attributable to defects in structure, not defects in ethics.  See 
WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 221–33 (1999).  But see id. at 223.  (“No 
other system permits the kind of behavior from advocates that is not only tolerated in 
American courtrooms, but considered completely normal and ethical.”). 
 73 Saltzburg, supra note 51, at 683.  Frankel once anticipated this argument.  His 
response was that “[i]n the general run of cases . . . we are indeed able to know as 
lawyers what our adversaries would be delighted to have from us in the way of 
evidence.”  In fact, it is through knowing what evidence an adversary would find 
useful that lawyers are effective at withholding information.  Frankel also pointed out 
that the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is defined in terms of 
what evidence would help the defendant.  Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued, 
supra note 58, at 56. 
 74 See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND 
ETHICS 404–09, 417–18 (6th ed. 2002); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. 
RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 231–41 (3d ed. 
1994); DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE 
METHOD 180–82 (2d ed. 1998). 
 75 Two articles that have done so in the past fifteen years are Eugene R. Gaetke, 
Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989) and W. Bradley Wendel, 
Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895 (1996). Gaetke argued that lawyers 
should either stop referring to themselves as officers of the court or give meaning to 
that characterization, and he approvingly cited Frankel’s proposals as one way 
lawyers could do so.  Gaetke, supra, at 88–90.  Wendel proposed, for purposes of 
discovery only, a set of principles that included the following: (1) “With respect to 
matters of fact, the lawyer’s primary obligation is to the discovery of truth rather than 
to the advancement of the client’s interest, unless some clear countervailing interest 
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recent article arguing that prosecutors should be placed under an 
affirmative duty to promote the truth did not mention Frankel’s 
proposals.76  Another article, suggesting that the Model Rules be 
amended to require lawyers to disclose relevant information about 
“procedural matters,” also failed to cite Frankel.77  In 2000, after a 
three-year deliberative process, the ABA approved changes that 
slightly expand the duty of candor to the tribunal,78 but without 
citation to Frankel. 
Several factors could explain why Frankel’s proposals are no 
longer the subject of serious discussion.  For one thing, Frankel’s 
proposals may have struck most people as quixotic (in the case of the 
duty not to make misleading statements) or unworkable (in the case 
of the duty to disclose all relevant evidence).  Moreover, the process 
that resulted in the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct in 1983 showed that reforming the profession through 
changes in ethics rules was something of a hopeless cause.  In 1985, 
Deborah Rhode referred to “the bar’s demonstrated parochialism in 
enacting and enforcing ethical standards.”79  As Part II will show, the 
bar proved in the late 1970s and 1980s that it was not ready to allow 
anything even close to Frankel’s proposal to be adopted. 
Another possible reason why reform-minded commentators are 
not discussing Frankel’s proposals is that they are interested in the 
possibility of deep structural and institutional reform. Critics of the 
adversary system appear to be more interested in the possibility of 
borrowing elements from the continental systems than in modifying 
the ethics requirements in the American system.80  In recent books, 
 
is recognized[]”; and (2) “It is a breach of the lawyer’s duty as an officer of the court 
to fail to disclose information that would assist the tribunal in determining the case 
on its merits.”  Wendel, supra, at 935. 
 76 Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
309 (2001). 
 77 William H. Fortune, A Proposal to Require Lawyers to Disclose Information About 
Procedural Matters, 87 KY. L.J. 1099 (1998). 
 78 See infra text accompanying notes 128–33. 
 79 Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 
641 (1985). 
 80 See, e.g., PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH, supra note 72; Albert W. Alshuler, 
Lawyers and Truth-Telling, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 189 (2003) (commenting 
that the approach of critics, exemplified by John Langbein, who “would give judges 
greater independent responsibility for truth-seeking,” seems more promising than 
the approach of critics, exemplified by Frankel, who “would give lawyers greater 
responsibility for truth-telling”); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of 
the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1997); 
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two prominent and articulate proponents of reform in the legal 
profession have supported Frankel’s proposals, but also implied that 
those proposals are unlikely to be enacted without fundamental 
changes in attitudes, regulatory systems, and incentive structures.81  
Those same commentators present Frankel’s concerns as simply one 
branch of a larger problem.82 
II. FRANKEL’S PROPOSAL AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ETHICS 
The 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct grew out of a 
post-Watergate attempt to reform legal ethics.83  In 1977, the 
president of the American Bar Association, William B. Spann, Jr., 
appointed Omaha lawyer Robert Kutak to chair a commission 
 
Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95 (1996).  
Strier considered all of the rules and tactics that defeat truth in jury trials, and then 
proposed a wide variety of specific reforms, including (1) modifying exclusionary 
rules; (2) changing the composition of juries, i.e., improving the overall caliber of 
jurors, eliminating peremptory challenges, using specially qualified juries, and using 
mixed courts; (3) limiting witness coaching; and (4) giving judges more control over 
the proceedings.  Id. at 162, 166–72, 175–78, 179–80.  Strier supported his arguments 
with data from surveys of judges and jurors as to their attitudes about some of these 
reforms.  Id. at 100.  Strier did not, however, engage or even mention Frankel’s 
proposals.  See generally id. 
 81 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has proposed, among other additions, a Frankel-style 
change to the ethics codes: “Lawyers should not misrepresent or conceal a relevant 
fact or legal principle to another person (including opposing counsel, parties, 
judicial officers, third-party neutrals, or other individuals who might rely on such 
statements).”  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN 
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 136 (Deborah L. 
Rhode ed., 2000).  Menkel-Meadow then writes, “I have no expectation that such 
‘golden rules’ of lawyer behavior would ever be adopted by any regulatory or bar 
disciplinary body.”  Id.  Likewise, Rhode writes: 
In the long run . . . major improvement in adversarial practices will 
require major changes in bar ethical codes, enforcement patterns, and 
incentive structures. . . .  If American lawyers viewed the adversary 
process more as a search for truth and less as a sporting event, then 
such requirements would not appear unjust. . . .  The prospects for that 
agenda will depend on securing greater commitment from those 
within the profession and greater pressure from those outside it. 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
93–95 (2000). 
 82 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 81, at 130; Rhode, supra note 81, at 105. 
 83 For a good overview of the process that produced the Model Rules, see 
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 60–63 (student ed. 1986).  For a 
fascinating account of the politics behind the process, see Ted Schneyer, 
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989). 
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charged with a comprehensive review of legal ethics.84  Spann 
apparently “wanted a critical and outward-looking drafting committee 
in order to counteract the narrower and more traditional views that 
would prevail in the [ABA’s] House of Delegates.”85  One of the 
people appointed to the commission was Judge Marvin Frankel.86  
Over the next six years, the Kutak Commission87 produced a series of 
drafts, each less reformist than the one before.  As this section will 
show, early drafts reflected Frankel’s views, but those views were 
gradually washed out of later versions.  Although the lawyer’s duty of 
candor has been broadened in recent years, prevailing legal ethics 
standards are still far from what Frankel envisioned. 
The 1979 draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct88 was 
the Kutak Commission’s earliest and most reformist.  The rule on 
candor to the tribunal prohibited any “knowing misrepresentation of 
fact” (“misrepresentation” presumably includes misleading 
statements in addition to false ones).89  The rule also prohibited a 
lawyer from offering “without suitable explanation evidence that the 
lawyer knows is substantially misleading,” and it required the lawyer 
to disclose any fact, even if adverse, when the disclosure was necessary 
to correct a misapprehension, or when the fact “would probably have 
a substantial effect on the determination of a material issue of fact.” 90  
Some of the provisions did not apply to criminal defense lawyers.91  
This rule would have compelled the disclosure of virtually all material 
facts. 
The stated purpose of the provisions dealing with the disclosure 
of adverse facts was to address the limited circumstances in which an 
adversary should have presented a decisive fact, but did not do so.  
That is, the rule was designed to correct situations in which the 
 
 84 Schneyer, supra note 83, at 677. 
 85 Id. at 694–95. 
 86 Id. at 693. 
 87 The official name of the Kutak Commission was the Commission on Evaluation 
of Professional Standards.  See Chair’s Introduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/chair_intro.html (Sept. 1983). 
 88 See Text of Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite Committee, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 27, 
1979, at 26–47 [hereinafter MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (leaked draft 1979)]. 
 89 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2(a)(2) (leaked draft 1979), published in 
LEGAL TIMES, supra note 88, at 36.  For the full text of the draft rule, see the 
Appendix of this Article.  This draft, and subsequent ones, also contained enhanced 
duties of candor with respect to adverse law, see id. R. 3.2(a)(5), but those changes 
are outside the scope of this Article. 
 90 Id. R. 3.2(a)(3)(iii). 
 91 See id. R. 3.2. 
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adversary system—whose ability to reach truth is premised on the 
belief that competing adversaries will ferret out all relevant facts—
”manifestly has suffered breakdown.”92  The 1979 Draft rule 
resembled the proposal made several years earlier in The Search for 
Truth, and, like certain other reforms in the draft, the rule was almost 
certainly driven by Frankel himself.93 
The 1979 Draft was self-consciously bold.  The official comment 
to the draft rule regarding the duty of candor seems to echo 
Frankel’s skepticism of adversarial zeal.  The comment begins with 
the pronouncement that “[t]he duty to represent a client vigorously, 
and therein to maintain confidences of the client, is qualified by the 
advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal.”94  The prevailing standard 
on disclosure of adverse facts, the comment says, “relieves the careful 
advocate from responsibility for miscarried justice resulting from the 
inadequacies of an opponent [and has resulted] both in individual 
injustice and in the disrepute into which the adjudicative process has 
fallen: It is time the rule was changed.”95 
The Commission never did officially release the 1979 Draft.  
Rather, at a program held to promote the Commission’s efforts, 
Kutak showed the draft to Monroe Freedman.  Freedman was 
outraged at the diminished confidentiality protections.  He 
denounced the draft and apparently leaked it to the press.96  The bar 
was also outraged, both at the secrecy with which the draft had been 
developed and at specific provisions, especially the proposed duty of 
candor and the proposed limit on the confidentiality of attorney–
 
 92 Id. cmt. 
 93 The records of the Kutak Commission’s early meetings reveal that Frankel’s 
concerns occupied a substantial amount of the Commission’s attention.  One of the 
most hotly debated issues for the Commission was whether a duty to reveal client 
fraud should trump the duty of confidentiality.  In fact, the journals summarizing the 
discussions at the Commission’s preliminary meetings reveal that among the 
Commission members themselves, this question was known as the “Frankel problem.”  
See Journals of the ABA Special Committee on the Evaluation of Professional 
Standards, Aspen, 1977, at 29 [hereinafter Kutak Comm’n Journals].  The “Frankel 
Problem” was first in a list of problems with the Model Code prepared by one 
Commission member.  Id.  At Frankel’s urging, the Commission debated broadening 
a lawyer’s duty of candor to the court.  Frankel proposed that “the duty of the 
prosecution to disclose material evidence ought to be extended to defense counsel as 
well, subject only to applicable laws of privilege which are not matters of ethics.”  
Kutak Comm’n Journals, supra, N.Y., Dec. 1977, at 31. 
 94 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. (leaked draft 1979), published in 
LEGAL TIMES, supra note 88, at 36. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Schneyer, supra note 83, at 702. 
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client communications.97  The Kutak Commission watered down some 
of its reforms before releasing for comment its first public draft, 
known as the “Discussion Draft” of 1980.98 
For the Frankel-inspired duty of candor, the Discussion Draft 
entailed something of a retreat.99  This draft dropped the 
requirement that a lawyer disclose a fact that “would probably have a 
substantial effect on the determination of a material issue of fact.”100  
By contrast, the Discussion Draft retained the requirement that a 
lawyer disclose adverse facts when “necessary to correct a manifest 
misapprehension resulting from a previous representation the lawyer 
has made to the tribunal.”101  The comment following the duty of 
candor provision was similar to the comment in the 1979 rule, but 
 
 97 See Ethics Draft Ignites Uproar, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at 1, cited in Schneyer, 
supra note 83, at 702. 
 98 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980).  There 
were other drafts besides the 1980 Discussion Draft, of which the most widely 
published was the Proposed Final Draft of 1981, and each draft elicited comments.  
See COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS’N, WORKING DRAFT: 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1 (March 21, 1981); COMM’N ON 
EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS’N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT: MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (May 30, 1981) [hereinafter MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981)]. 
 99 The Kutak Commission also retreated on the duty of confidentiality.  The most 
dramatic changes from the leaked draft to the Discussion Draft appear to be that 
where the leaked draft would have required disclosure when necessary “to prevent 
the client from committing an act that would seriously endanger the life or safety of a 
person, result in wrongful detention or incarceration of a person or wrongful 
destruction of substantial property, or corrupt judicial or governmental procedure,” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b)(1) (leaked draft 1979), published in 
LEGAL TIMES, supra note 88, at 28, the Discussion Draft would have required 
disclosure “to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing 
an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm to another person.”  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (Discussion Draft 1980). 
This provision and others were further narrowed in subsequent drafts.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (“A lawyer 
may reveal [information relating to the representation of a client] to the extent the 
lawyer believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal or 
fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm, or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another[.]”); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (“A lawyer may reveal 
[information relating to the representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal 
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily 
harm[.]”). 
 100 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (Discussion Draft 1980).  The full 
relevant text is reprinted in the Appendix of this Article. 
 101 Id. R. 3.1(d)(ii). 
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the consciously critical tone of the 1979 Draft had been moderated.102 
The Discussion Draft received widespread attention in the press 
(where the reforms met with approval),103 bar journals,104 and 
academia.105  The Kutak Commission solicited comments on the 
Discussion Draft from a wide cross section of the bar.106  In general, 
the bar reacted negatively to the Discussion Draft.107  Some of the 
most common complaints concerned the organization of the new 
rules, proposed mandatory pro bono requirements, and the 
diminished confidentiality protections.108 
Some lawyers were concerned that the new duties of candor and 
confidentiality, by compromising the attorney–client relationship, 
would impair a lawyer’s ability to function effectively in the adversary 
system.109  The New Jersey Bar Association complained that Rule 
3.1(a)(3) of the Discussion Draft, which prohibited offering 
“substantially misleading” evidence, “plays havoc with the adversary 
system” by requiring the advocate “to function as an extension of the 
 
 102 Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 
 103 Schneyer, supra note 83, at 696–97. 
 104 See generally, e.g., Symposium, Proposed New ABA Code, 54 CONN. B. J. 259 (1980); 
Carol Grant, Attorney–Client Privilege and the Proposed Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, 6 NAT’L J. CRIM. DEFENSE 163 (1980). 
 105 See generally, e.g., Review Symposium, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 921; Robert J. Kutak, The Rules of Professional Conduct in an 
Era of Change, 29 EMORY L.J. 889 (1980); James H. Stark, The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 12 CONN. L. REV. 948 (1980). 
 106 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface (Discussion Draft 1980). 
 107 See generally COMPILATION OF COMMENTS ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., ed., 1980) [hereinafter HAZARD, COMMENTS]. 
 108 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ii–vi (Proposed Final Draft 1981). 
 109 For example, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent 
Defendants wrote: 
Taken as a whole, the Model Rules . . . reflect a retreat from the 
traditional view of a lawyer’s role as confidant and zealous 
representative of the client.  The traditional view of the lawyer’s role 
has generally been accepted as beneficial not only to the client but to 
the judicial system and society as well.  The protection afforded to 
clients’ confidences under the present Code increases the likelihood 
that a client will exhibit candor toward the lawyer and will consult with 
counsel.  This enables the lawyer to act more effectively in meeting 
obligations to the client, the court and the community. . . .  [G]reatly 
enlarging the circumstances in which disclosure of information 
regarding a client is permitted, or mandating such disclosure, may very 
well reduce candor and further erode the effectiveness and credibility 
of our legal system. 
3 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, § O-40, at 27–28 (response of ABA Standing 
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants). 
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court in a truth-seeking role.”110  The Association argued that this 
provision could have the same effect as the recently dropped 
requirement that a lawyer volunteer adverse evidence because the 
withholding of such evidence often has a misleading effect.  “The 
requirement for candor on the part of the lawyer,” the Association 
argued, “must be tempered by the need for preserving the integrity of 
the adversary system.”111 
The New Jersey Bar Association also expressed concern over the 
requirement112 that a lawyer take affirmative steps to address the prior 
presentation of false evidence.  The Association suggested that the 
rule be limited so as to require disclosure only when the false 
evidence amounts to a fraud on another person or the court, writing 
that it “recognizes the intent of this Rule and does not argue with its 
purposes but feels that the Proposed Rule constitutes too great an 
erosion of the lawyer–client relationship.”113  The bar associations 
critical of the proposed rules on confidentiality and candor generally 
made arguments nearly identical to those voiced by the critics of 
Frankel’s original proposal.114 
Not all bar associations were hostile toward the proposed rule.  
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York said, “it approves 
of the concept” of Rule 3.1(a)—including the prohibition on offering 
misleading evidence—and criticized only the drafting.115  Likewise, 
the Omaha Bar Association116 indicated that it accepted the rule,117 as 
did the Arkansas Bar Association, which stated that it “strongly 
supports . . . this rule requiring candor toward a tribunal,”118 with one 
 
 110 1 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, Comments on Rule 3.1, at 3 (response 
of Special Committee of the New Jersey Bar Ass’n). 
 111 1 Id. 
 112 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(b) (Discussion Draft 1980). 
 113 1 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, Comments on Rule 3.1, at 4 (response 
of Special Committee of the New Jersey Bar Ass’n). 
 114 See supra text accompanying notes 68–70. 
 115 1 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, Comments on Rule 3.1, at 12–14 
(response of Committee on Professional & Judicial Ethics of the Ass’n of the Bar of 
the City of New York). 
 116 It bears mention that Robert Kutak was one of the most prominent members 
of the Omaha Bar.  For a professional biography of Robert Kutak, see 
http://www.kutakrock.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=DspLinkDetail&link_id=82&site_i
d=0&cat=0 (Jan. 24, 2005). 
 117 3 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, § O-54, at 4 (response of Omaha Bar 
Ass’n).  3 id. at 4–5. 
 118 3 id., § O-57, at 4 (response of Arkansas Bar Ass’n). 
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minor exception.119 
The controversy provoked by the Discussion Draft led to the 
“Proposed Final Draft” of May 30, 1981, which retreated almost 
entirely from the original Frankel-influenced position.  The 
affirmative duty to disclose adverse facts to the tribunal may not have 
generated as much controversy as some of the other proposals in the 
Discussion Draft,120 but the Kutak Commission was under intense 
pressure, and it compromised most of its reforms. 
The duty of candor provision in the 1981 Draft only prohibited 
lawyers from (1) making false statements of fact; (2) failing to 
disclose facts in a case in which silence is equivalent to a material 
misrepresentation; (3) failing to disclose facts necessary to prevent a 
fraud on the tribunal; and (4) offering false evidence.  Additionally, 
under the 1981 Draft, a lawyer who later learns that previously 
presented evidence was false must take “reasonable remedial 
measures.”121  Comparing the Discussion Draft to the 1981 Draft, the 
1981 version disposed of (1) the rule prohibiting a lawyer from 
presenting “substantially misleading” evidence; (2) the requirement 
that a lawyer disclose facts, even if adverse, when necessary to correct 
a manifest misapprehension resulting from a previous representation 
by the lawyer; and (3) the specification that “reasonable remedial 
measures” to rectify the consequences of false evidence may include 
disclosing a client’s confidence or the fact that a client is implicated 
in the falsification.  In addition, the 1981 Draft limited the remedial 
obligation to cases in which the false evidence is material. 
The final version of the rules presented to and approved by the 
ABA’s House of Delegates in 1983 contained even fewer constraints.  
The prohibition on making false statements of fact was limited to 
“material” facts, and the Rules dropped the last remnant of the 
Frankel duties from the 1981 Draft—the requirement that a lawyer 
affirmatively disclose facts when failing to do so would constitute a 
material misrepresentation.122  The bar was apparently unwilling to 
 
 119 The exception was a section of the rule that permitted attorneys to disclose 
adverse evidence to the opposite party.  The Arkansas Bar Association objected to 
that section on the grounds that the provision would conflict with the discovery 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  3 id. 
 120 The most controversial proposals were those pertaining to pro bono 
requirements, diminished confidentiality protections, and the enhanced duty to 
disclose adverse law to the court.  See generally HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107. 
 121 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).  (See the 
Appendix of this Article for the text of the draft rule). 
 122 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983). 
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accept ethics rules that proscribed any conduct short of fraud or 
fabrication.  The comments to the rules, however, did observe that 
“[t]here are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the 
equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.”123 
Frankel’s ideas did survive in one minor respect.124  Starting with 
the initial leaked draft, the Kutak Commission had included 
provisions that would put a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding under 
two of the duties Frankel proposed in The Search for Truth—to disclose 
all material evidence, and not to mislead the tribunal.125  The 
rationale was that with only one advocate, the normal fact-finding 
process, in which the truth emerges from a clash of adversaries, could 
not possibly function.126  Those provisions survived the drafting 
process, and today the rules require a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding 
to “inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that 
will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or 
not the facts are adverse.”127 
Recently, the pendulum of the main duty of candor rule has 
begun to swing in the direction of more truthfulness.  The rule was 
broadened by amendments approved in 2000 after a three-year 
comprehensive review of the Model Rules.128  Under the new rule, a 
lawyer may not make any false statement of fact (the prohibition is no 
longer limited to material facts), and a lawyer must now correct a 
previous false statement of material fact.129  The requirement that a 
lawyer remedy the effects of presenting false evidence now applies 
not just to evidence offered by the lawyer, but also to evidence 
 
 123 Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 
 124 The point that this provision reflects Frankel’s influence is made in Schneyer, 
supra note 83, at 700 n.136. 
 125 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (leaked draft 1979), published in 
LEGAL TIMES, supra note 88, at 39; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 
(Discussion Draft 1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (Proposed Final 
Draft 1981). 
 126 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2002). 
 127 Id. R. 3.3(d); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 
112 (2000) (on Advocacy in Ex Parte Proceedings).  It would be interesting to 
research whether, in states that have adopted this requirement, it has made a 
difference either in the case law or in general practice. 
 128 A complete overview and analysis of the history of the ethical duty of candor 
would require substantial additional research that is beyond the scope of this Article, 
including an examination of the legislative history of the 2000 amendments and the 
commentary from the bar and the academy.  However, based on the research that 
has been conducted for this Article, the Frankel proposals were no longer a 
reference point for the 2000 proposals.  See supra text accompanying notes 74–82. 
 129 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002). 
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offered by the lawyer’s client or a witness.130  The rule also specifies 
that a necessary remedy for the presentation of false evidence may be 
disclosure that the evidence was false131 (language to that effect had 
been dropped from the Discussion Draft132).  Similarly, the rule 
requiring affirmative disclosure of adverse facts when necessary to 
avoid assisting in the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act has 
been broadened to require that a lawyer take “reasonable remedial 
measures” whenever the lawyer knows that a client intends to engage, 
has engaged, or is currently engaging in “criminal or fraudulent 
conduct related to the proceeding.”133 
Standards of legal ethics are still a far cry from those Frankel 
envisioned.  The text of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, which was adopted in 1998, largely tracks the Model Rules.134  
Like the Model Rules, the Restatement studiously avoids prescribing an 
affirmative duty to help the tribunal reach the truth.  Misleading 
statements are not explicitly prohibited, and there is no affirmative 
duty to disclose a fact that the other side failed to bring to the court’s 
attention.135  Although the comment to the duty of candor rule in the 
Model Rules states that “[t]here are circumstances where failure to 
make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative 
misrepresentation,”136 the Restatement explicitly permits omissions 
that are arguably misleading.137 
 
 130 Id. R. 3.3(a)(3). 
 131 Id. 
 132 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(b) (Discussion Draft 1980). 
 133 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2002).  By contrast, the new rules 
exempt criminal defense lawyers from the provision that formerly allowed all lawyers 
to refuse to offer evidence that they reasonably believe is false.  Id. R. 3.3(a)(4). 
 134 Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, §§ 112, 120 (on, respectively, Advocacy 
in Ex Parte and Other Proceedings, and False Testimony or Evidence), with MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1998) (on the Duty of Candor), and MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002) (same).  The reporter’s notes to section 120 of the 
Restatement mention the unique New Jersey rule, together with a citation to The Search 
for Truth. 
 135 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 120. 
 136 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3 cmt. (2002).  This understanding 
was reflected in the 1981 draft’s explicit requirement that a lawyer shall not “fail to 
disclose a fact in circumstances where the failure to make the disclosure is the 
equivalent of a lawyer’s making a material misrepresentation.”  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3(a) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).  The fact that this 
requirement was moved out of the text of the rule and into the comment suggests 
that the framers of the Model Rules were reluctant to prohibit misleading omissions 
categorically. 
 137 The section on false statements of fact includes an illustration in which a 
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The lack of attention to the value of truth in contemporary 
ethics standards is also reflected in the provisions governing the 
questioning of witnesses.  The Kutak Commission did not devote 
much attention to the issue of whether lawyers should be allowed to 
question witnesses in a way that misleads the trier of fact.138  The 
Restatement, as well as the annotations to the Model Rule on “Respect 
for Rights of Third Persons,”139 imply that the truthfulness of the 
impression created by the questioning is simply not an operative 
constraint.  Both authorities do little more than cite Subin’s article140 
and the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice.141 
The ABA Standards, which have been changed many times over 
the past thirty years, do not impose a high standard of truthfulness, 
nor are they worded strongly.  Under the current version, “[a] 
prosecutor should not use the power of cross-examination to 
discredit or undermine a witness if the prosecutor knows the witness 
is testifying truthfully.”142  A prosecutor who strongly believes—yet 
does not know for certain—that a witness is testifying truthfully is 
 
defense lawyer knows that a contract signed by his client and the plaintiff’s decedent 
was superceded by a materially revised version.  In the illustration, the defense lawyer 
elicits testimony from the defendant about “the contract that you and Plaintiff’s 
decedent signed,” presents the original contract to the defendant, asks “Is this the 
contract that you and Plaintiff’s decedent signed?,” and receives an affirmative reply 
from the defendant.  This constitutes a violation of the Restatement’s prohibition 
against materially false evidence.  By contrast, the defense lawyer will have violated 
no provision in the Restatement if the lawyer does not first elicit the testimony, and the 
plaintiff’s lawyer, unaware that the revised agreement was in writing, solicits oral 
testimony from a third party to which the defense lawyer successfully objects under 
the statute of frauds.  The defendant lawyer obtains a directed judgment for his 
client with no violation.  RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 120 cmt. d, illus. 1-2.  A 
defense lawyer under a Frankel duty presumably would be required to disclose the 
existence of the written document. 
 138 See generally Kutak Comm’n Journals, supra note 93.  At one point in the 
Commission’s early discussions, an unnamed member, possibly Frankel, suggested 
that the draft rule on fairness to an opposing party and counsel “also proscribe[s] 
attempts to induce witnesses to give untruthful or misleading evidence,” but this 
suggestion does not appear to have occupied much discussion.  Id., S.F., Dec. 1978, at 
9. 
 139 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2002). 
 140 See supra note 39. 
 141 CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT 426–27 (4th. ed. 1999); RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 106 cmt. c, 
reporter’s note. 
 142 AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, Standard 3-5.7(b) (Prosecution Function) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 1149 (2001-2002 ed., John S. 
Dzienkowski ed., 2001). 
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presumably free to discredit that witness.143  For defense lawyers, the 
corresponding provision imposes no obligation to the truth 
whatsoever: “Defense counsel’s belief or knowledge that the witness is 
telling the truth does not preclude cross-examination.”144  The ABA 
Standards also provide that prosecutors and defense attorneys should 
not “ask a question which implies the existence of a factual predicate 
for which a good faith belief is lacking.”145 
III. NEW JERSEY’S EXPERIENCE WITH RULE 3.3(A)(5) 
A.  Overview 
A number of states have adopted the Model Rules, but some 
state supreme courts have made changes to them—typically 
diminishing to varying degrees the confidentiality protections that 
the bar fought so hard to add to the Kutak Commission drafts.146  One 
state, New Jersey (the first state to adopt the Model Rules), inserted 
an affirmative duty to disclose adverse facts.147  New Jersey’s duty of 
candor rule tracked the 1983 Model Rule almost exactly, with one 
major exception: Rule 3.3(a)(5) of the New Jersey Rules of 
Professional Conduct required that a lawyer not knowingly “fail to 
disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge that the 
tribunal may tend to be misled by such failure.”  This provision had 
no equivalent in the Model Rules. 
This unique requirement brought New Jersey, on paper at least, 
closer than any American jurisdiction ever has been to implementing 
the original Frankel proposals.  A leading ethics treatise, Hazard and 
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, characterized this requirement as “a 
radical proposition indeed [that] begins to carry out [a] direct attack 
on the adversary system.”148  Rule 3.3(a)(5), treated literally, would go 
even further than the Kutak Commission’s Discussion Draft 
 
 143 Cf. id. (“The prosecutor’s belief that the witness is telling the truth does not 
preclude cross-examination, but may affect the method and scope of cross-
examination.”). 
 144 Id., Standard 4-7.6(b) (Defense Function), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 142, at 1164. 
 145 Id. Standards 3-5.7(b), 4-7.6(d). 
 146 See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 83, at 713. 
 147 I have not researched whether, in the states besides New Jersey that adopted 
the Model Rules, there was any discussion of inserting Frankel-type duties. 
 148 2 GEOFFREY A. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § AP4:104, 
at 1264 (2d ed. 1990). 
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(although not necessarily further than the leaked draft of 1979), 
because it effectively makes the attorney responsible for a 
misapprehension on the part of the tribunal that the attorney could 
have prevented.149  For example, if one lawyer fails to conduct 
adequate discovery, and the opposing lawyer learns of a material 
witness who could establish a particular fact, the second lawyer must 
disclose the existence of the witness, even though that lawyer might 
have won the case otherwise.150  A statement that is literally true but 
misleading because factually incomplete would likewise appear to 
violate the rule.  Hazard and Hodes describe such a regime as “a 
‘processing’ system, in which lawyers on each side put the other side 
through its paces, but cooperate in an effort to reach a ‘correct’ and 
‘fair’ result.”151 
In 2003, the Supreme Court of New Jersey responded to 
dissatisfaction with the rule by weakening it.152  The new rule 
prohibits a lawyer from “fail[ing] to disclose to the tribunal a material 
fact knowing that the omission is reasonably certain to mislead the 
tribunal, except that it shall not be a breach of this rule if the 
disclosure is protected by a recognized privilege153 or is otherwise 
prohibited by law.”154  That is, a lawyer in New Jersey is no longer 
required to disclose a material fact simply because the tribunal “may 
tend to be misled” by that omission.  The duty is only triggered if the 
omission is reasonably certain to mislead.  Additionally, the rule does 
not require disclosure if the disclosure would violate a privilege or 
other law. 
This section recounts the history of New Jersey Rule 3.3(a)(5)’s 
adoption, presents perspectives about it from the academy and the 
practicing bar, and discusses its application.155  Initially, Rule 
 
 149 The Discussion Draft’s affirmative disclosure requirement only applied to a 
situation in which the court’s misapprehension was the result of a previous statement 
the attorney had made.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(d)(ii) (Discussion 
Draft 1980). 
 150 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § AP4:104, at 1264 n.4. 
 151 Id. at 1265. 
 152 The New Jersey Constitution gives the New Jersey Supreme Court exclusive 
rule-making authority for the state’s constitutional courts.  N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, 
para. 3; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950). 
 153 This phrasing seems infelicitous.  As a matter of semantics, a privilege does not 
protect a disclosure, but rather, it protects a fact from being disclosed. 
 154 N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(5) (2004). 
 155 This Article primarily deals with the first version of Rule 3.3(a)(5).  The new 
version of this rule only became effective January 1, 2004, and at the time this Article 
was prepared, the new version had not been applied in any reported cases. 
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3.3(a)(5) was used not to change the nature of adversarial combat, 
but to discipline attorneys who commit manifest abuses—conduct 
that judges would likely find objectionable under the more 
permissive rules of other jurisdictions.  In recent years, however, New 
Jersey courts have used the rule to support various pronouncements 
from the judiciary that lawyers are expected to be truthful.  The most 
significant such pronouncement came in the recent Seelig case,156 in 
which the New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to be putting lawyers 
on direct notice that they will be held to a higher standard of candor 
than they would be in other jurisdictions. 
B.  The History of Rule 3.3(a)(5) 
Rule 3.3(a)(5), along with other significant departures from the 
Model Rules,157 was adopted solely on the initiative of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court.  The Court had convened a special committee 
chaired by Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise to study the Model Rules 
and recommend whether to adopt them in New Jersey.158  The 
Debevoise Committee recommended adopting the Model Rule on 
the duty of candor as written; the committee said nothing about 
extending the duty of candor to include affirmative disclosure 
requirements.159  But Chief Justice Wilentz was known to be 
concerned about public confidence in the legal profession,160 and his 
Court made a number of changes to the Debevoise Committee’s 
recommendations—all of which were intended to strengthen a 
lawyer’s obligation to the public, arguably at the expense of the duty 
to the client.161 
 
 156 180 N.J. 234, 850 A.2d 477 (2004). 
 157 Another major change was to the confidentiality provisions.  The ABA rules 
permitted disclosure “to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.”  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).  The rule adopted by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court requires mandatory disclosure to prevent a client “from committing a 
criminal, illegal, or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result 
in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or property 
of another” or is likely to “perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal.”  N.J. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT 1.6 (2002) (emphasis added to show departure from Model Rules). 
 158 See Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, N.J. LAW J., July 28, 1983, supp. at 1, 112 N.J.L.J. 93, supp. at 1. 
 159 Id. at 13. 
 160 Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Redefining of Professional Ethics 
in New Jersey under Chief Justice Robert Wilentz: A Legacy of Reform, 7 SETON HALL CONST. 
L.J. 351, 389 (1997). 
 161 See generally id.  In a statement that accompanied the new rules, Chief Justice 
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The inspiration for Rule 3.3(a)(5) is not entirely clear.  The 
comment that accompanies the rule states that the additional 
provision applies to “facts that are at issue in the case as well as facts 
relating to the management of the case,” and declares, with citations 
to supporting cases, that “an attorney has an obligation to be candid 
and act with good faith toward the tribunal.”162 As members of a 
reform-minded court, the justices would presumably have been 
familiar with the Kutak Commission’s earlier drafts, aware of the 
debates surrounding those drafts, and interested in the reformist 
proposals that the larger ABA rejected.  However, I have been unable 
to find evidence confirming that the Court was consciously following 
the Kutak Commission drafts that reflected Frankel’s views.163 
Rule 3.3(a)(5) has been controversial from its inception.  One 
outspoken commentator has said that the provision 
perhaps more than any other, illustrates the modification of the 
adversary system so as to render it more consistent with the value 
of truth. . . .  The rule seems to conflict with the basic premise 
that an advocate must present a client’s cause in its best light.  It 
has long been recognized that the lawyer has no duty to reveal 
adverse facts or to come forward with adverse witnesses. . . .  The 
basic assumption is that the truth will emerge out of the clash of 
adversarial presentation of the evidence.164 
This critic has complained as well that the rule poses constitutional 
problems in the criminal setting.165 
The practicing New Jersey bar has also expressed concern.  
When the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct were first 
publicized, Raymond Trombadore, then Vice President of the New 
 
Wilentz stated: “[W]e believe that these new [New Jersey] Rules of Professional 
Conduct represent sound principles that protect the public and the integrity of the 
legal profession and maintain New Jersey’s position as a leader in setting and 
upholding high professional standards.”  Press Release, Administrative Office of the 
Courts: State of New Jersey, Rules of Professional Conduct (July 19, 1984) (cited in 
Leslie Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who 
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 94–95 nn.50 & 51 (1994)). 
 162 N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2002). 
 163 There are no records of the Court’s deliberations.  Retired Justice Stewart 
Pollock was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court at the time, and he cannot 
recall the discussions about this issue, but he points out that the members of the 
Court would have seen the earlier ABA drafts.  Telephone Interview with Stewart 
Pollock, Of Counsel, Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti (Jan. 4, 2003). 
 164 Michael P. Ambrosio, The “New” New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct: Reordered 
Priorities for Public Accountability, 11 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 121, 138 (1987). 
 165 Id. at 138–39. 
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Jersey State Bar Association, wrote to the Supreme Court that Rule 
3.3(a)(5) had generated “near universal concern” and tried to 
convince the Court not to implement it.166  Several years later, 
Trombadore, even though he was by then the chair of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court Disciplinary Review Board, nonetheless told an ethics 
symposium that the language of Rule 3.3(a)(5) 
is so broad and so sweeping that it essentially destroys whatever 
confidentiality exists between lawyer and client, because it is 
totally unlimited. . . .  I am satisfied, just from my knowledge of 
practice, that the rule is violated, grossly violated, by every lawyer 
who does trial work, because no lawyer can represent a client and 
comply with that rule. . . .  Obviously, everything unfavorable to 
the client would have to be disclosed, because, without it the 
tribunal might be misled.167 
Similarly, until the rule’s language was changed in 2003, the leading 
handbook on ethics issues in New Jersey complained that the literal 
meaning of the rule “is so far afield from accepted notions of 
advocacy . . . that the precise letter of the rule is rarely honored other 
than in the breach.”168 
The controversy has continued to this day.  In 2001, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court appointed a commission to study the New 
Jersey rules in light of the ABA’s 2000 amendments to the Model 
Rules.169  The members of this Commission, which was chaired by 
retired New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart Pollock, were aware 
that New Jersey’s rule is unique, but they were not aware of the 
original Frankel proposals and they did not discuss the similarity 
between Rule 3.3(a)(5) and certain provisions in the early Kutak 
Commission drafts that reflected Frankel’s views.170  The Pollock 
Commission debated extensively what to say about Rule 3.3(a)(5) 
and decided by a close vote to recommend keeping the rule, but to 
recognize in its report “the tension that the rule places on the 
 
 166 Letter from Raymond R. Trombadore, First Vice President, New Jersey State 
Bar Ass’n, to the Supreme Court of New Jersey 2 (Aug. 9, 1984) (cited in Levin, supra 
note 161, at 95 n.52). 
 167 Raymond R. Trombadore, The New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct: A Recipe for 
Good Lawyering, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 606, 610 (1988). 
 168 KEVIN H. MICHELS, NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY ETHICS 605 (Gann 2003). 
 169 See REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ 
reports/2002finalreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2005). 
 170 Telephone Interview with Stewart Pollock, supra note 163. 
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attorney–client relationship.”171 
In a telephone conversation, Justice Pollock172 acknowledged 
that there are valid arguments that an attorney’s overriding duty of 
candor to the court could chill a client’s willingness to confide in an 
attorney; that the tensions between this duty and the lawyer’s duty to 
the client are especially strong in the criminal context; and that in 
the civil context, sanctions for discovery abuses presumably target 
much of the same conduct.  Justice Pollock nonetheless supported 
the rule because he believed that “as a normative statement, it’s a 
good idea to remind lawyers that they should not mislead the 
court.”173 
Once again, the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from the 
recommendations of its appointed committee, but this time the 
Court acted to narrow, rather than broaden, the rule.174 The Court 
invited public comments on the Pollock Commission’s report, and 
the New Jersey Bar Association recommended deleting the Rule: 
[T]he very nature of the rule makes compliance difficult.  As 
noted in the [Pollock] Commission’s report[,] the rule strains the 
attorney–client relationship by placing a duty on a lawyer to 
disclose information that may be adverse to the client’s interest.  
Further, how is a lawyer to know when a judge “may be misled” by 
a failure to disclose?  What if a judge is simply confused, does the 
rule require a lawyer to bring every potentially material fact to the 
court’s attention, even information forgotten or ignored by an 
adversary?  Just how far must a lawyer go?175 
The Court took these concerns seriously.  In amending the rules, it 
noted that the New Jersey State Bar Association had recommended 
removing the rule “because the very nature of the rule makes 
compliance difficult.”  The Court went on to say that “[i]n light of the 
concerns of the Bar” and the disagreements within the Pollock 
Commission, it had decided to amend Rule 3.3(a)(5) “to clarify its 
 
 171 REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 169, at 12–13. 
 172 Justice Pollock authored a concurring opinion in 1998 on the subject of the 
tension between a lawyer’s duty to his client and his duty of candor to the tribunal.  
See infra notes 214–32 and accompanying text. 
 173 Telephone Interview with Stewart Pollock, supra note 163. 
 174 See supra text accompanying notes 153–54. 
 175 N.J. STATE BAR ASS’N, RESPONSE TO THE REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 
COMMISSION ON THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND AD HOC COMMITTEE ON BAR 
ADMISSIONS 11–12 (Apr. 2003) (on file with author). 
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scope.”176 
C.  The Impact of Rule 3.3(a)(5) 
It is unclear to what extent Rule 3.3(a)(5) matters in the 
everyday lives of most New Jersey lawyers.  In its twenty years of 
existence, the rule has been mentioned in only about thirty-five 
published decisions,177 approximately half of which simply report a 
disciplinary order.178  As of late 2002, a prominent practitioner who 
defends lawyers charged with ethics violations was aware of the rule 
but had never represented anyone charged with violating it.179  Of 
course, the existence of the rule since 1984 could have led New Jersey 
lawyers to change their conduct in ways not reflected in the cases.  
But many lawyers may not even be aware of the rule.  One leading 
ethics specialist who gives continuing legal education presentations 
on legal ethics finds that members of his audience are often surprised 
and concerned when they learn of the rule.180  But consciousness of 
the rule is likely to increase.  The recent Seelig case is an extended 
treatment of Rule 3.3(a)(5), and it reads like a wake-up call to the 
profession on the subject of attorney candor. 
For a long time after the rule’s adoption, New Jersey courts and 
disciplinary bodies appeared to be reluctant to enforce Rule 
3.3(a)(5).  A member of New Jersey’s Disciplinary Review Board has 
reportedly stated that “the Board had avoided sanctioning lawyers 
based on alleged violations of . . . [Rule 3.3(a)(5)] because of 
 
 176 Supreme Court of New Jersey, Administrative Determination in Response to 
the Report and Recommendation of the Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, N.J. LAW J., Sept. 22, 2003, at 59, 65, 173 N.J.L.J. 1131, 1137. 
 177 This estimate includes all cases available in the LEXIS and Westlaw databases 
as of September 10, 2004. 
 178 Disciplinary proceedings that resulted only in an admonition by the 
Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) would not be reported.  If the DRB recommends 
any other sanction, the disciplinary order must be reviewed by the state Supreme 
Court and would therefore be reported.  See OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF N.J., 2003 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEM REPORT 14–
15 (Aug. 6, 2004), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/oae/annual_report03. 
pdf. 
 179 Telephone Interview with Albert C. Jeffers, Of Counsel, Celli & Schlossberg 
(Dec. 2002).  Mr. Jeffers also guessed that among plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers in 
the personal injury and property damage area, “that rule may be frequently honored 
in the breach.”  Id. 
 180 Telephone Interview with Kevin H. Michels, Partner, Michels & Hockenjos 
(Sept. 7, 2004).  Mr. Michels is the author of the leading treatise on New Jersey 
ethics, MICHELS, supra note 168. 
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fundamental bar disagreement with the rule.”181  The reported 
decisions of the Board bear out this purported reluctance, but they 
also suggest that the Board in recent years has become more 
aggressive in its use of the rule.  As of September 10, 2004, the Board 
had only found a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(5) in approximately twenty-
three cases,182 but more than half of those decisions were rendered in 
2000 or later.183  Moreover, the earlier cases finding a violation of 
Rule 3.3(a)(5) usually found violations of other rules as well, 
suggesting that the conduct was sanctionable under a more 
traditional ethics regime.184  In the past several years, however, the 
Board has several times relied exclusively on Rule 3.3185 and even, in 
three decisions reported in 2002,186 purely on Rule 3.3(a)(5). 
A state ethics advisory opinion from 1990 provides further 
evidence of New Jersey’s initial reluctance to strictly enforce Rule 
3.3(a)(5).187  The opinion addressed whether an attorney was 
obligated to disclose that his mentally ill patient had been 
hospitalized when the terms of the patient’s right of visitation with his 
daughter depended on his medical condition.  The Advisory 
 
 181 Levin, supra note 161, at 149 n.303.  The article did not clearly attribute the 
quote or provide a specific context for it. 
 182 The number may be slightly higher because sometimes the New Jersey 
Supreme Court only mentions a violation of “RPC 3.3(a)” without specifying the 
relevant subsection.  See, e.g., In re Vella, 180 N.J. 170, 170, 850 A.2d 439, 439 (2004); 
In re Uchendu, 177 N.J. 509, 509, 830 A.2d 501, 501 (2003); In re Girdler, 171 N.J. 
146, 146, 792 A.2d 1243, 1243 (2002). 
 183 Whenever the Board decides that a lawyer should be disciplined, the case goes 
to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  See 2003 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 178, at 14–15.  Usually, the Supreme Court affirms the 
Board’s decision in a brief published order that states only the name of the lawyer, 
the rules the lawyer has violated, and the sanctions imposed.  See, e.g., In re Malat, 175 
N.J. 554, 817 A.2d 316 (2003); In re Santiago, 175 N.J. 499, 816 A.2d 152 (2003).  
Occasionally, the Supreme Court publishes a full opinion.  See, e.g., In re Norton, 128 
N.J. 520, 608 A.2d 328 (1992); In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472, 569 A.2d 252 (1990). 
 184 For example, In re Telson, 138 N.J. 47, 648 A.2d 703 (1994), which happens to 
include a one-sentence description of the offense, involved a lawyer who was found 
to have altered a court document and later lied about the alteration.  Id. at 47, 648 
A.2d at 703.  Rule 3.3(a)(5) is not needed to punish this sort of outright fraud. 
 185 See Malat, 175 N.J. at 554, 817 A.2d at 316; Santiago, 175 N.J. at 499, 816 A.2d at 
152.  These cases also cite Rule 8.4, but Rule 8.4 should not be treated as a separate 
rule because unlike Rule 3.3, it is a vague catch-all that does not set forth specific 
norms of conduct. 
 186 In re George, 174 N.J. 537, 810 A.2d 60 (2002); In re Witman, 174 N.J. 338, 805 
A.2d 455 (2002); In re McGivney, 171 N.J. 34, 791 A.2d 215 (2002).  Two of these 
cases also cite Rule 8.4, but again, it should not be treated as a separate rule. 
 187 N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 643 (1990), N.J. LAW J., May 24, 
1990, at 2, 24, 125 N.J.L.J. 1358, 1380. 
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Committee on Professional Ethics noted that requiring disclosure in 
these circumstances “would have especially harsh consequences.”188  
The Committee recommended that a lawyer balance the client’s 
interests rather than literally observe Rule 3.3(a)(5), and stated that 
“[a] decision that a fact is really material, or that a tribunal will 
actually be misled in the absence of disclosure, is not to be made 
lightly or easily, especially where, as here, there are serious negative 
implications of disclosure, chilling essential communications to an 
attorney.”189 
D.  Cases Involving Rule 3.3(a)(5) 
In most of the opinions that have implicated Rule 3.3(a)(5), 
New Jersey courts did not appear, as a practical matter, to be 
demanding a greater level of candor than courts in other 
jurisdictions.190  Courts in other jurisdictions, both before and after 
the Model Rules were adopted, have disciplined or criticized lawyers 
for blatantly misleading omissions in addition to fraudulent 
commissions.  Until very recently, Rule 3.3(a)(5) appeared to have 
been used almost exclusively to censure attorneys for failing to 
disclose information in circumstances which, under the conventional 
rules, would constitute a misrepresentation anyway.  However, with 
Seelig and a few other recent cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
appears to be willing to criticize or punish lawyers for conduct that 
might very well have been permissible in other jurisdictions. 
 
 188 Id. at 24, 125 N.J.L.J. at 1380. 
 189 Id. 
 190 The set of relevant cases includes the following: (a) six disciplinary cases in 
which the New Jersey Supreme Court published an opinion based in part on Rule 
3.3(a)(5); b) two solely-authored concurring opinions of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court that used Rule 3.3(a)(5) to emphasize the importance of candor, see 
Kosmowski v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 175 N.J. 568, 576–77, 818 A.2d 319, 324 (2003) 
(LaVecchia, J., concurring) and Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal 
Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 463–64, 713 A.2d 411, 424–25 (1998) (Pollock, J., concurring); 
(c) a case, later almost completely adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, in 
which the intermediate appellate court used Rule 3.3(a)(5) to support a novel 
discovery requirement, McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 330 N.J. Super. 568, 586–
88, 750 A.2d 189, 199 (App. Div. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 167 N.J. 359, 771 A.2d 
1153 (2001); and (d) five cases in the federal district court in New Jersey and New 
Jersey’s intermediate appellate court that referred to Rule 3.3(a)(5).  Excluded from 
this set of relevant cases are most of the Supreme Court decisions that only 
summarily affirm the Disciplinary Review Board, opinions in which the 
misrepresentation in question concerned an application for bar admission or an 
attorney’s qualifications to practice before a court, and opinions in which the 
reference to Rule 3.3(a)(5) is cursory. 
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The most relevant category of cases in this context is disciplinary 
proceedings involving a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(5).  New Jersey 
courts have twice used Rule 3.3(a)(5) to sanction lawyers for failing 
to disclose the death of a client.191  Courts in other jurisdictions have 
criticized similar conduct, even though those courts could not cite a 
local equivalent of New Jersey Rule 3.3(a)(5).192  In fact, in 1995, the 
ABA issued an advisory opinion stating that when a client dies in the 
middle of settlement negotiations, the attorney has a duty to disclose 
that fact both to the court and to opposing counsel in the first 
communication to either.193  The ABA opinion relied on one of the 
non-New Jersey cases as persuasive authority for its conclusion that 
the failure to disclose the death of a client to the court is equivalent 
to an affirmative misrepresentation within the meanings of Rule 
3.3(a)(1) and Rule 4.1(a) of the Model Rules.194  The opinion 
reasoned that since the death of a client means that the lawyer either 
no longer has a client, or has a different client as a result of the 
client’s death, a failure to disclose the death “is tantamount to 
making a false statement of material fact.”195  The committee found it 
significant that the comments to Rules 3.3 and 4.1 state that under 
some circumstances, the failure to disclose a fact is the equivalent of 
an affirmative misrepresentation.196 
In two other cases, New Jersey attorneys were disciplined for 
failing to report that property which the attorney had previously 
 
 191 In re Vella, 180 N.J. 170, 850 A.2d 439 (2003); In re Forrest, 158 N.J. 428, 434–
35, 730 A.2d 340, 343–44 (1999).  Vella contains only an order, not an opinion, but 
the decision clearly arises out of Ms. Vella’s failure to inform the court and the 
opposing party of her client’s death in the case of Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J. 
Super. 144, 153–54, 797 A.2d 206, 212 (App. Div. 2002).  At the end of the Kingsdorf 
opinion, the court noted, along with a citation to Forrest, that it was referring the 
opinion to the Office of Attorney Ethics for possible proceedings against Ms. Vella.  
Id. at 160 n.3, 797 A.2d at 215 n.3. 
 192 See, e.g., Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507, 
511–12 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Fell, 364 N.E.2d 872, 873–74 (Ohio 
1977). 
 193 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397 
(Sept. 18, 1995), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT: ETHICS OPINIONS 1991–1995, at 1001:313 (1996). 
 194 Id. at 1001:315 (citing Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 512). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3 cmt. (1983) (“There 
are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an 
affirmative misrepresentation.”) and MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 4.1 
cmt. (2002) (“Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.”)).  See also supra 
note 136 and accompanying text. 
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represented as belonging to one person had since been transferred 
to another person.  In one of these cases, an attorney was disciplined 
for not revealing—at his own divorce proceeding—that he had 
transferred to his mother a piece of real property that he had listed as 
an asset in papers previously submitted to the court.197  The other 
New Jersey case198 was actually decided before the adoption of Rule 
3.3(a)(5), but was later cited in support of the adoption of that 
rule.199  In this case, an attorney was disciplined under the disciplinary 
rules when he failed to disclose that he had transferred property that 
was the subject of a settlement.200 
Other jurisdictions have imposed sanctions for comparable 
conduct.  In a 1985 Arizona case, a lawyer was disciplined under 
Arizona’s version of the old Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility for making misleading statements and presenting 
misleading testimony regarding the existence of one of his client’s 
assets in the client’s divorce proceeding.201  Similarly, in 1975, a lawyer 
representing the executor of an estate was disciplined under 
California’s statutes on professional conduct for failing to disclose 
that the devisee of the estate had written a letter waiving, in favor of 
the decedent’s disinherited daughter, the devisee’s interest in the 
estate.  At the time, the lawyer was both prosecuting an action to 
challenge the daughter’s joint ownership of the major asset in the 
estate, and also defending against a will contest launched by the 
daughter.202  The letter effectively rendered both proceedings 
unnecessary. 
One possible reason why the New Jersey disciplinary cases 
discussed above seem similar to cases in other jurisdictions is that the 
omissions in the New Jersey cases violate the established principle 
that an attorney should notify the court when a representation 
previously made to the court is no longer correct.  In fact, the 2002—
but not the 1983—ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct specify 
that a lawyer has a duty to “correct a false statement of material fact 
 
 197 In re Kernan, 118 N.J. 361, 362–63, 571 A.2d 1282, 1282–83 (1990). 
 198 In re Nigohosian, 88 N.J. 308, 442 A.2d 1007 (1980). 
 199 See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (1984). 
 200 Nigohosian, 88 N.J. at 309–12, 442 A.2d at 1007–09.  The specific provisions 
cited were DR 1-102(A)(4), (5).  Id. at 314, 442 A.2d at 1010. 
 201 In re Ireland, 706 P.2d 352, 354 (Ariz. 1985).  The disciplinary rule cited was 
Arizona Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102; the court was not specific as to 
which provisions had been violated.  See id. 
 202 Sullins v. State Bar of Cal., 542 P.2d 631, 632–35 (Cal. 1975). 
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or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer” as well as a duty 
to “take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal” when a lawyer has offered material 
evidence and later comes to know of its falsity.203  In the four New 
Jersey decisions discussed above, an explicit or implicit 
representation that the lawyer had made—the existence of a client or 
the existence of a piece of property in a certain party’s hands—was 
now false. 
The other New Jersey Supreme Court opinions finding a 
violation of Rule 3.3(a)(5) would also likely have come out the same 
way in a different jurisdiction.  In one case, a New Jersey attorney was 
found to have violated Rule 3.3(a)(5) when he failed to disclose that 
he had borrowed over $30,000 of a client’s trust funds.204  This 
behavior was such a fundamental ethical violation that the failure to 
disclose it is almost beside the point.  In two other cases, New Jersey 
prosecutors were disciplined for failing to disclose to the court that a 
police officer had corrupt motives for not testifying against a 
defendant.205  New Jersey is not alone in punishing this sort of 
collusive behavior.  An Arizona court found a violation of the local 
version of Model Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) when a lawyer 
failed to disclose that he had reached a collusive agreement with 
defense counsel to dismiss the action against one of the defendants.206 
Finally, courts in New Jersey have occasionally used Rule 
3.3(a)(5) in cases other than disciplinary proceedings to criticize 
attorneys or to support a holding.  For example, the Appellate 
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court suggested that an attorney 
had violated the duty of candor when, in suing for unpaid fees, the 
lawyer did not reveal that there had already been an arbitration 
concerning those fees.207  This case, along with a pre-Model Rules 
disciplinary opinion that also involved a failure to disclose a 
settlement,208 is analogous to a case in Arizona in which the court 
 
 203 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1), (2) (2002). 
 204 In re Gifis, 156 N.J. 323, 347, 361, 717 A.2d 406, 419, 427 (1998). 
 205 In re Norton, 128 N.J. 520, 522–39, 608 A.2d 328, 329–38 (1992) (disciplining 
the defense attorney as well as the prosecutor); In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472, 472–78, 
569 A.2d 252, 253–56 (1990). 
 206 In re Alcorn, 41 P.3d 600, 602–05, 614 (Ariz. 2002). 
 207 Horowitz v. Weishoff, 318 N.J. Super. 196, 203–04, 723 A.2d 121, 125 (App. 
Div. 1999).  The court cited only R. 3.3 of the New Jersey Rules.  The court did not 
specify which provision the attorney had violated, but the only applicable provision is 
R. 3.3(a)(5). 
 208 In re Stein, 97 N.J. 550, 551–52, 560–62, 483 A.2d 109, 109–10, 114–15 (1984) 
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used Arizona’s version of Model Rule 3.3(a) to sanction a lawyer who 
had failed to disclose a settlement agreement to a settlement judge.209  
Likewise, in a 1997 West Virginia case, an attorney who failed to 
disclose at trial that two defendants had reached a settlement 
agreement was found to have violated “the general duty of candor.”210 
The New Jersey cases discussed so far are mostly conservative in 
two ways.  First, they do not mark a sharp departure from earlier case 
law.  As already discussed, it is likely that if they had arisen in another 
jurisdiction, they would have come out the same way.  In addition, 
almost all of these cases concern a failure to disclose facts relating to 
the management of the case, not facts actually at issue in the case.211  
When it first adopted Rule 3.3(a)(5), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
had stated that the provision applies to “facts that are at issue in the 
case as well as facts relating to the management of the case.”212  And 
yet almost none of these cases deal with a lawyer who fails to disclose 
a fact relating to the substance of a dispute.213  The death of a client, 
the existence of a prior arbitration or settlement, and the reasons for 
a police officer’s failure to testify all go not to the truth for which a 
trial is supposed to be a search, but to the parameters within which 
that search occurs.  It is as if the New Jersey courts insisted on 
knowing who the players are and why they are fighting, but did not 
want to intervene in the game itself.  Like a boxing referee, the courts 
stepped in only when absolutely necessary. 
E. A New Direction, Possibly 
Four recent opinions from the New Jersey Supreme Court 
concerning Rule 3.3(a)(5) and the duty of candor are much bolder 
and are unique enough that they might have been decided 
 
(disciplining lawyer for not disclosing the existence of a civil settlement that probably 
influenced a victim’s decision to withdraw a criminal charge in the same matter).  
The respondent was charged with violating DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6).  Id. at 562, 
483 A.2d at 115. 
 209 In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 976–78 (Ariz. 1995). 
 210 Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391, 400 (W. Va. 1997). 
 211 An exception is In re Kernan, 118 N.J. 361, 571 A.2d 1282 (1990), in which the 
lawyer did not tell the court that he had transferred an asset to his mother during his 
own divorce proceeding.  Id. at 362–63, 571 A.2d at 1282–83.  As discussed above, this 
case was also based on the familiar principle that a lawyer has a duty to correct a 
representation that later turns out to be incorrect.  See supra text accompanying notes 
197, 203.  The Court was probably also concerned that the conduct resembled a 
fraudulent conveyance. 
 212 N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2002). 
 213 For this observation I am indebted to MICHELS, supra note 168, at 633. 
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differently in another jurisdiction.  Two of the opinions recognize a 
duty to make the court and opposing counsel aware of material facts 
at issue in the case.  In different ways, each opinion seems to aspire to 
a regime of the type Frankel envisioned.  This quartet of opinions 
may augur the beginning of an era in which the standard of attorney 
candor in New Jersey is noticeably higher than in other jurisdictions. 
The first of these opinions was a concurring opinion authored in 
1998 by Justice Pollock.214  Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban 
Renewal Associates215 was a slip-and-fall case in which the lawyers for the 
owner of property concealed their client’s bankruptcy status as part 
of the “trial strategy.”  Because the plaintiff did not know that the 
owner of the property was in bankruptcy, she wasted time and 
resources proceeding against the owner instead of the bankruptcy 
trustee.  The owner was not in control of the property and the 
defense lawyers knew the owner would therefore not be found 
liable.216  The answer included as a defense that “the alleged damages 
were caused by other persons over whom this defendant had no 
control,” and, in response to interrogatories about the owner of the 
building, the defense lawyers stated that it was in the care of a “Court 
appointed Manager.”217  The plaintiff’s lawyer not only failed to use 
this hint, but also waited until nine days before trial to take the 
deposition, at which the lawyer finally learned of the bankruptcy 
status.  At that point, the lawyer believed (wrongly) that it was too late 
to name the trustee in bankruptcy as a defendant.218 
Justice Pollock used the occasion to comment on “the 
obligations of lawyers to each other and to the judicial system.”219  The 
justice was dismayed at the costs to the plaintiff, the courts, and the 
public that could have been saved had the defense lawyers simply 
disclosed their client’s bankruptcy status in their answer to the 
complaint.220  Justice Pollock concluded that various rules and codes 
of conduct, among them Rule 3.3(a)(5), “require what common 
courtesy and candor suggest, that pleadings and answers to 
 
 214 After retiring from the Court, Justice Pollock chaired the Commission that 
recommended keeping Rule 3.3(a)(5) at the same time that it signaled to the Court 
that the rule creates tensions.  See supra text accompanying notes 169–71. 
 215 154 N.J. 437, 713 A.2d 411 (1998). 
 216 See id. at 459–63, 713 A.2d at 422–24 (Pollock, J., concurring). 
 217 Id. at 443–44, 713 A.2d at 414. 
 218 Id. at 456, 713 A.2d at 420. 
 219 Id. at 463, 713 A.2d at 424 (Pollock, J., concurring). 
 220 See id. at 462, 713 A.2d at 424 (Pollock, J., concurring). 
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interrogatories should not contain half-truths intended to mislead 
both adversaries and the court.”221  Justice Pollock drew support from 
two out-of-state cases222 and went on to state that “[s]henanigans have 
no place in a law suit.  Modern litigation is too time consuming and 
expensive for courts to tolerate discovery abuses.  For over fifty years, 
courts have endeavored to transform civil litigation from a battle 
royal into a search for truth.”223 
This opinion is striking.  For one thing, it uses strong language 
to criticize conduct that, under prevailing standards of ethics, is far 
from an obvious violation.  Second, the opinion calls on lawyers to 
disclose adverse facts at issue in a case.  The defense lawyers in Kernan 
did not go out of their way to help the plaintiff’s lawyer, but they 
probably believed that it was not their duty to do so.  The Court’s 
opinion did not even discuss the issue of candor, apart from stating 
in a single sentence that defense counsel “should have informed 
plaintiff that [the defendant] was in bankruptcy and that a trustee 
had been appointed.”224  If the defense lawyers’ lack of candor was 
such an obvious violation, the Court should have had more to say.  
But only one other justice signed on to Justice Pollock’s opinion.225  
Furthermore, one of the two out-of-state cases that Justice Pollock 
quoted specifically stated that the disclosure at issue in that case 
might not have been required by any “canon of ethics or legal 
obligation.”226  The other out-of-state case concerned the failure to 
 
 221 Kernan, 154 N.J. at 464–65, 713 A.2d at 425 (Pollock, J., concurring). 
 222 Id. 465–66, 713 A.2d at 425–26 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Spaulding v. 
Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (setting aside settlement of a personal 
injury action because defense counsel did not disclose that defense’s doctor had 
discovered an internal injury arising out of the accident that plaintiff did not know 
about) and Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507 
(E.D. Mich. 1983)).  Compare Spaulding with Southern Trenching, Inc. v. Diago, 600 
So. 2d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing a jury verdict in a personal injury 
action because the plaintiff “deliberately concealed” the fact that he had also been 
injured in a later, unrelated accident and “thus falsely misled the court and jury that 
his damages could have been caused only by the defendant’s negligence”).  The 
Southern Trenching court was particularly offended that the trial judge, in denying the 
defendant’s post-trial motion, “actually saw fit to praise the plaintiff’s 
disingenuousness.”  600 So. 2d at 1167 n.3.  The trial judge had written, “Plaintiff did 
not tell either expert of the [later] accident because, in his own words, ‘They never 
asked me! I was told not to volunteer.’  Would that all witnesses would be so direct!”  Id. 
 223 Kernan, 154 N.J. at 467, 713 A.2d at 426 (Pollock, J., concurring). 
 224 Id. at 462, 713 A.2d at 424 (Pollock, J., concurring). 
 225 See id. at 467, 713 A.2d at 427 (Justice Coleman joining the concurring opinion 
of Justice Pollock). 
 226 Id. at 465, 713 A.2d at 425 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Spaulding, 116 
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disclose the death of a client,227 which, as discussed above,228 is widely 
regarded as a serious violation.  Finally, Justice Pollock’s opinion 
acknowledged that “[m]ore egregious examples of discovery abuse 
may exist.”229 
All of these circumstances suggest that Justice Pollock—who 
after retiring from the bench argued for the retention of Rule 
3.3(a)(5) because he believed that it serves as a useful normative 
reminder230—was deliberately using the case to send a message about 
the importance of candor.231  In light of current ethical standards, the 
strength of his admonition appears to be out of proportion to the 
obfuscation that prompted it.  It was not clear whether Justice Pollock 
was trying to work towards curbing extreme abuses or, more 
dramatically, changing the level of candor generally considered 
acceptable in New Jersey.  In any case, the opinion has been cited in 
each of the other three recent Supreme Court opinions admonishing 
lawyers about the importance of candor.232 
Another concurring opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
was notable because it specifically discussed Rule 3.3(a)(5), even 
though the statements at issue were flatly false and therefore a 
violation of the more conventional rules.  Kosmowski v. Atlantic City 
Medical Center233 involved an attorney who attempted to postpone a 
trial by stating that his expert witness, a neurosurgeon, was 
unavailable.  The plaintiffs’ lawyer declared, “The problem is, Judge, 
I found out on Friday that Dr. Doyle, the plaintiffs’ expert, is in 
Europe.  And is not going to be available for two weeks.”234  It was true 
 
N.W.2d 704). 
 227 Id. at 465, 713 A.2d at 425–26 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Virzi, 571 F. 
Supp. 507). 
 228 See supra text accompanying notes 191–96. 
 229 Kernan, 154 N.J. at 467, 713 A.2d at 426 (Pollock, J., concurring). 
 230 See supra text accompanying note 173. 
 231 Justice Pollock later said, in a speech based on his Kernan opinion published in 
the New Jersey Law Journal, that “[w]hat caught my eye [in the case] was the tension 
between the duty of the defense lawyer to his client, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, to the plaintiff and the court.”  He also said that the Kernan case “started me 
thinking” about that tension.  Stewart Pollock, Duty to Client vs. Duty to Court: The 
Rules of Professionalism Direct Lawyers to Conduct Themselves with Dignity and Fairness, N.J. 
LAW J., Oct. 12, 1998, at 23, 154 N.J.L.J. 115. 
 232 In re Seelig, 180 N.J. 234, 850 A.2d 477 (2004); Kosmowski v. Atlantic City Med. 
Ctr., 175 N.J. 568, 818 A.2d 319 (2003); McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 
359, 771 A.2d 1153 (2001). 
 233 175 N.J. 568, 818 A.2d 319 (2003). 
 234 Id. at 573, 818 A.2d at 322. 
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that on Friday Dr. Doyle’s wife told the lawyer that Dr. Doyle was in 
Europe.  However, that very morning the attorney had spoken with 
Dr. Doyle by telephone and learned that he had returned from 
Europe, though would not be available to testify until the latter 
portion of the next week.235  The trial judge, unaware of the reality, 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.236  The Supreme Court’s 
opinion addressed whether the dismissal was proper in light of the 
attorney’s lack of candor.237 
Justice LaVecchia wrote a brief concurrence.  The justice’s main 
point was that “[a]s adopted in New Jersey, Rule of Professional 
Conduct (RPC) 3.3 imposes on attorneys a ‘stringent’ burden of 
disclosure,” a burden that—and here Justice LaVecchia quoted 
Justice Pollock’s Kernan opinion—is greater than the one imposed by 
the ABA version.238  The opinion dealt mostly with Rule 3.3(a)(5) and 
implied that the plaintiffs’ lawyer could have been sanctioned under 
the ethics rules.239 
However, Justice LaVecchia did not need to use Rule 3.3(a)(5) 
to make her point.  The plaintiffs’ lawyer made a false statement of 
material fact and therefore clearly violated, in New Jersey or any 
other jurisdiction, Rule 3.3(a)(1) or an equivalent.  The lawyer had 
stated, “I found out on Friday that Dr. Doyle, the plaintiffs’ expert, is 
in Europe.”240  Since Dr. Doyle’s lawyer knew that Dr. Doyle was no 
longer in Europe, the statement was false.241  The fact that Justice 
LaVecchia was willing to rest criticism of an attorney’s conduct on a 
rule not even necessary for that criticism suggests an increasing 
awareness of the rule and a willingness to interpret it more broadly. 
Another New Jersey Supreme Court opinion enunciated a novel 
rule regarding the duty to disclose during discovery.242  The holding 
was supported in part using Rule 3.3(a)(5).243 McKenney v. Jersey City 
 
 235 Id. at 572, 818 A.2d at 321–22. 
 236 Id. at 573, 818 A.2d at 322. 
 237 See id. at 570, 573, 818 A.2d at 320, 322. 
 238 Id. at 576–77, 818 A.2d at 324 (LaVecchia, J., concurring). 
 239 Kosmowski, 175 N.J. at 576–78, 818 A.2d at 324–25 (LaVecchia, J., concurring). 
 240 Id. at 573, 818 A.2d at 322 (emphasis added). 
 241 It would have been technically accurate, though highly misleading, if the 
lawyer had said, “On Friday I was told Dr. Doyle is in Europe.  And he is not going to 
be available until the end of next week.” 
 242 McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 359, 771 A.2d 1153 (2001) 
[hereinafter McKenney II], rev’g 330 N.J. Super. 568, 750 A.2d 189 (App. Div. 2000) 
[hereinafter McKenney I]. 
 243 The Supreme Court opinion does not directly mention Rule 3.3(a)(5), but the 
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Medical Center involved witnesses whose testimony at trial was 
inconsistent with their deposition testimony.244  The plaintiff’s counsel 
was caught off-guard, and the Supreme Court found that “defense 
counsel had a continuing obligation to disclose to the trial court and 
counsel for plaintiffs any anticipated material changes in a 
defendant’s or a material witness’s deposition testimony.”245  The 
Court acknowledged that New Jersey’s rules of civil procedure do not 
specify any such duty.  Nonetheless, the Court held that such a duty 
follows inevitably from the rules’ purpose of eliminating surprise.246  
The Appellate Division had written, in language adopted by the 
Supreme Court, “We thus take this opportunity to make explicit what 
is plainly implicit in our discovery practice.”247 
The oxymoronic “plainly implicit” is a clue that neither court 
wanted to acknowledge how dramatic a departure this holding 
actually was from mainstream discovery requirements.  In federal 
practice, for example, there is an ongoing duty to supplement or 
correct prior disclosures with respect to every discovery device but 
depositions.248  In McKenney, the Appellate Division was distorting the 
federal rule when it wrote, in language quoted by the Supreme 
Court, “Although the Advisory Committee’s notes indicate that the 
provision establishing a continuing duty to disclose does not apply to 
deposition testimony, the express language of the Rule is not so 
limited.”249  In fact, the language of the federal rule is so limited.250  
The point of the Advisory Committee note is to indicate that the 
wording of the new rule, which expressly mentions every discovery 
device except for the deposition, was intended to exclude deposition 
 
Appellate Division opinion stated, albeit in a footnote, that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, including Rule 3.3(a)(5), support its position, McKenney I, 330 N.J. Super. 
at 588 n.1, 750 A.2d at 199 n.1, and the Supreme Court adopted the Appellate 
Division’s opinion.  The Supreme Court stated, “We agree with the Appellate 
Division’s . . . legal analysis concerning a lawyer’s duty of disclosure in such 
circumstances,” and then quoted the entire relevant section of the Appellate Division 
opinion, except for the footnotes.  McKenney II, 167 N.J. at 370–71, 771 A.2d at 1159–
60. 
 244 McKenney II, 167 N.J. at 366–67, 771 A.2d at 1157. 
 245 Id. at 371, 771 A.2d at 1160. 
 246 Id. at 370, 373, 771 A.2d at 1159, 1161. 
 247 Id. at 370, 771 A.2d at 1159 (quoting McKenney I, 330 N.J. Super. at 588, 750 
A.2d at 200). 
 248 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2). 
 249 McKenney II, 167 N.J. at 371, 771 A.2d at 1160 (quoting McKenney I, 330 N.J. 
Super. at 589, 750 A.2d at 200). 
 250 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2). 
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testimony.251 
With McKenney, the New Jersey Supreme Court appears to be 
trying to make lawyers cooperate in the search for truth.  McKenney 
effectively makes a lawyer responsible for ensuring that the adversary 
and the court are fully apprised of the substantive facts at issue in a 
case.  In that respect, McKenney—which was authored by Justice 
Coleman (the only justice to join Justice Pollock’s Kernan opinion)—
resembles Justice Pollock’s opinion in Kernan, which McKenney cites.252  
Both opinions arguably contemplate a modification of the adversary 
system in the direction that Frankel envisioned. 
The final New Jersey Supreme Court opinion implicating the 
duty of candor is In re Seelig.253  This recent decision, handed down in 
June of 2004, is probably the most remarkable one of the set.  In 
1998, Jack Seelig was representing Jeffrey Poje, who had caused a 
deadly automobile accident.  Poje was arrested, and the county 
prosecutor charged him with manslaughter and death by automobile.  
Later, the township police department issued summonses to Poje for 
motor vehicle offenses arising out of the same accident.  At the 
municipal court hearing on the motor vehicle offenses, Jack Seelig, 
without informing the judge of the pending indictable offenses, had 
Poje plead guilty to the motor vehicle offenses.  The result, as Seelig 
well knew, was that under New Jersey law, there was now a double-
jeopardy bar to prosecuting Poje on the more serious pending 
charges.  The judge did not make the inquiries that he was required 
to make as he accepted the plea, nor did he notify the county 
prosecutor as he was supposed to, in order to give the prosecutor a 
chance to have the municipal proceedings stayed.254 
Seelig was charged with a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(5) for failing 
to bring the pending indictable charges to the attention of the 
municipal judge.255  Seelig’s case divided a district ethics committee,256 
 
 251 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1994) (stating that the 1993 
version of the rule clarifies that the ongoing duty to supplement does not 
“ordinarily” apply to deposition testimony).  For the point that the Court’s 
description of the federal rule is wrong, I am indebted to William S. Gyves, The Duty 
to Disclose Inaccurate Deposition Testimony: Appellate Division Ruling Puts New Jersey Law at 
Odds with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, N.J. LAW J., Sept. 4, 2000, at 28, 32, 161 
N.J.L.J. 1048, 1052. 
 252 167 N.J. at 371–72, 771 A.2d at 1160–61. 
 253 180 N.J. 234, 850 A.2d 477 (2004). 
 254 Id. at 237–41, 850 A.2d at 479–81. 
 255 Id. at 237, 850 A.2d at 479. 
 256 In 2001 the Committee voted 2–1 to dismiss the ethics complaint.  The 
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as well as the Disciplinary Review Board,257 but the Supreme Court was 
unanimous.  Writing for the Court, the chief justice recounted the 
history of Rule 3.3(a)(5)258 and reflected on “the double character of 
an attorney’s duty.”259  The Court made the remarkable 
pronouncement that Rule 3.3(a)(5) “is a paradigm for [a] shift” from 
“the client’s interest to the legal system and the public interest.”260  
And, after reviewing the key Rule 3.3(a)(5) disciplinary cases, as well 
as Justice Pollock’s Kernan opinion, the Court cited, for the first time, 
the proposal that Marvin Frankel published in 1975—the Rule’s likely 
indirect ancestor.261 
Indeed, the Court’s analysis of Seelig’s conduct probably would 
have pleased Frankel.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that in 
Poje’s case, the system had broken down in that the judge and 
prosecutors had failed to fulfill their responsibilities.  However, the 
Court insisted that Seelig had a duty to correct this breakdown.262  
The ethics rules “compel a lawyer to act affirmatively against his or 
her client’s interests even when the primary responsibility for 
informing the court does not (or may not) lie with the lawyer.”263  The 
Court refrained from punishing Seelig because the issue was novel, 
and he had acted in good faith.264  Justice LaVecchia (the author of 
the Kosmowski concurrence) wrote separately to argue that Seelig 
should have been disciplined.265 
Seelig gives teeth to Rule 3.3(a)(5).  The outcome would likely 
not have been the same in a jurisdiction with a traditional duty of 
candor rule.  A 1994 advisory opinion of the Texas Bar’s ethics 
committee found that at sentencing, a defense lawyer who knows that 
the defendant has prior convictions may remain silent when the 
judge incorrectly states that the defendant has no prior conviction, 
 
dissenter was the lone non-lawyer on the three-member panel.  Mary P. Gallagher, 
Ethics Panel Clears Lawyer Charged with Lack of Candor to Tribunal, N.J. LAW J., Aug. 20, 
2001, at 4, 165 N.J.L.J. 704. 
 257 In June 2002 the Board decided by a vote of 4–3 that Seelig had violated Rule 
3.3(a)(5), but five votes would have been required to actually discipline Seelig.  180 
N.J. at 241–45, 850 A.2d at 482–84. 
 258 Id. at 245–49, 850 A.2d at 484–86. 
 259 Id. at 248, 850 A.2d at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 260 Id. at 249, 850 A.2d at 487. 
 261 Id. at 250, 850 A.2d at 487. 
 262 Id. at 252–53, 850 A.2d at 488–89. 
 263 Seelig, 180 N.J. at 253, 850 A.2d at 489. 
 264 Id. at 256–58, 850 A.2d at 491–92. 
 265 Id. at 258–59, 850 A.2d at 492 (LaVecchia, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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even when the judge asks the district attorney, “Right?”266 According 
to that opinion, it is not the defense lawyer’s duty to make the court 
aware of every piece of information that could increase the 
defendant’s punishment.  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Seelig 
essentially found otherwise.  The Court in Seelig would probably have 
been even less likely to agree with a 1991 Maryland court that held 
that a lawyer did not violate ethical rules when he failed to disclose to 
police and at the arraignment that his client was operating under a 
false identity.267 
These recent opinions appear to signal a desire on the part of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court to modify the adversary ethos.  It is 
true that the Supreme Court recently acted to weaken Rule 3.3(a)(5), 
but these changes may have simply been an attempt to make the rule 
more acceptable to the profession so as to encourage compliance 
with it.  (The Supreme Court nearly stated as much.268)  All of the 
cases discussed in this Article were decided under the old rule, but as 
it turns out, none of them, not even the more adventurous ones, are 
likely to have come out differently under the new rule.  None of these 
cases deals with a situation in which the attorney’s conduct might 
have “tend[ed]” to mislead the tribunal but was not “reasonably 
certain” to have done so.  And none of these cases deals with the 
potential situation that has so troubled some of the critics of Frankel, 
the early Kutak Commission drafts, and Rule 3.3(a)(5); namely, one 
in which the attorney might have to disclose privileged information.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s changes to Rule 3.3(a)(5) make the 
rule a more credible instrument of enforcement, but they do not 
remove its potential to modify the way adversarial business is 
conducted in New Jersey’s legal system. 
CONCLUSION 
The experience of New Jersey suggests that simply enacting 
ethics rules of the type Frankel envisioned is unlikely to make trials 
 
 266 State Bar of Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 504, 58 TEX. B.J. 718, 718–19 
(1995). 
 267 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488 (Md. 1991).  But see In 
re Seig, 515 N.W.2d 694 (Wis. 1994) (holding that lawyer violated local ethics rules in 
not disclosing that a client was using the client’s brother’s name in connection with 
traffic offenses); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Heffernan, 569 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio 
1991) (holding that lawyer violated Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-
102(B)(1) for failing to disclose that his client had falsely assumed the identity of his 
brother for purposes of his brother’s traffic offense). 
 268 See supra text accompanying note 176. 
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more truthful without a broader commitment to candor on the part 
of the legal profession.  The evidence strongly suggests that Rule 
3.3(a)(5) notwithstanding, New Jersey courts have not been 
comfortable enforcing, and New Jersey lawyers are not comfortable 
observing, a broader duty of candor than exists in other jurisdictions.  
In New Jersey, as in other jurisdictions, a lawyer is not responsible for 
helping the tribunal arrive at the truth. 
The question is whether, over an extended period of time, a 
series of cases like McKenney and Seelig could gradually induce lawyers 
to be more committed to the truth.  The bar’s hostile reaction to the 
early Kutak Commission drafts, as well as the reception of Rule 
3.3(a)(5), are reminders that American lawyers have a deep-seated 
view of themselves as partisan gladiators.  That conception of the 
lawyer’s role does not leave much room for a duty to make the 
tribunal aware of information that could damage a client’s cause. 
New Jersey’s experience with Rule 3.3(a)(5) can help us to 
evaluate some of the major arguments made against Frankel’s 
proposal over the years.269  The experience of New Jersey does not 
bear on the arguments that in an adversary system some values take 
precedence over truth, and that the ultimate end of truth-seeking 
sometimes requires the deliberate subversion of truth.  Those are 
larger philosophical issues.  Likewise, New Jersey’s experience does 
not help to evaluate the argument that Frankel’s proposals would 
weaken the attorney–client relationship and discourage effective 
representation because New Jersey has not systematically enforced 
Rule 3.3(a)(5).270 
New Jersey’s experience with Rule 3.3(a)(5) does, however, 
support the prediction that simply writing stricter ethics rules is 
unlikely to change adversarial conduct.  Pizzi and Saltzburg argued271 
that the nature of an adversary system puts pressure on ethics rules.  
A lawyer whose job is to win for the client will always test the 
boundaries of permissible conduct, shading facts to present them in 
the light most favorable to the client.  Until recently, lawyers, 
disciplinary bodies, and judges seemed to have a common 
understanding that lawyers simply cannot, consistent with their role, 
observe the letter of the old Rule 3.3(a)(5).  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court tacitly acknowledged this point when it narrowed Rule 
 
 269 See supra Part I.B. 
 270 See supra text accompanying notes 68–70. 
 271 See supra text accompanying notes 71–72. 
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3.3(a)(5), and recognized the bar’s complaint that “the very nature 
of [Rule 3.3(a)(5)] makes compliance difficult.” 
The new rule, however, if treated literally, would continue the 
old rule’s dramatic departure from the traditional adversary system.  
The new rule exempts privileged communications from disclosure.  
This prevents lawyers from having to disclose client confidences and 
therefore relieves the most extreme tension created by the rule.  But 
most material facts, or facts without which the tribunal could be 
misled, are not privileged.  Anything the lawyer learns from anyone 
other than the client is not privileged, and even if the lawyer learns 
the information from the client, the information is not privileged 
unless confidential.  For example, the facts withheld in McKenney and 
Seelig were not privileged.  In fact, Frankel’s original proposal had 
included an exception for privileged communications. 
The other major change to the rule is from “may tend to be 
misled by such failure” to “is reasonably certain to be misled by such 
failure.”  But the significance of that change depends—as does the 
meaning of Rule 3.3(a)(5) more generally—entirely on what “misled 
by such failure” means, and that is not an easy question.  The word 
“misleading” is well understood.  “Misleading” is the standard used in 
SEC Rule 10b-5,272 probably the most famous example in American 
law of a standard prohibiting deception.  Most people understand 
that a statement is misleading if, while literally accurate, it causes the 
person who hears the statement to believe something other than what 
the speaker knows to be correct. 
“Misled by such failure” is much more difficult.  This phrase 
refers to the effect of an omission on the hearer, not to the properties 
of a statement.  The phrase appears to presume an objectively 
truthful, correct, or complete version of events.  If a tribunal fails to 
perceive that version, it has been misled.  If the tribunal fails to 
perceive that version because it was not aware of a particular fact, 
then that fact must be material and the failure to disclose it violates 
Rule 3.3(a)(5).  Conversely, if a fact is material, then by definition, it 
could affect the tribunal’s understanding of events, and that means 
that without that fact, the court could be misled.  The definition of 
“misled” as used in Rule 3.3(a)(5) thus collapses into the definition 
of materiality, or the other way around.  Either way, the change from 
“may tend to be misled” to “reasonably certain to be misled” seems to 
deal only with the importance of the withheld fact to the issue on 
 
 272 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). 
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which it will shed light—in other words, with how material the fact 
actually is.  But if a fact is not very material, then a failure to disclose 
it does not matter much.  The difference between the new rule and 
the old rule, then, is that the new rule does not apply to insignificant 
cases. 
In other words, the new version of the rule retains the key 
feature of the old version, which is also the basic difficulty of this rule 
and indeed with parts of Frankel’s original proposal in an adversary 
system of procedure.  That difficulty, reflected in one form or 
another in nearly all of the criticisms of Rule 3.3(a)(5), the early 
Kutak Commission drafts, and Frankel’s proposal, is that a duty of 
affirmative candor requires the lawyer to think in some sense about 
what result the court should reach.  But a lawyer hired to help a 
particular client is in a poor position to make that judgment.  If New 
Jersey’s Supreme Court continues its experiment, we will find out 
whether lawyers are incapable or merely, for the time being, 
unwilling. 
APPENDIX 
DEC. 16, 1974: FRANKEL’S PROPOSAL 
(1) In his representation of a client, unless prevented from 
doing so by a privilege reasonably believed to apply, a lawyer shall: 
 (a) Report to the court and opposing counsel the existence 
of relevant evidence or witnesses where the lawyer does not intend to 
offer such evidence or witnesses. 
 (b) Prevent, or when prevention has proved unsuccessful, 
report to the court and opposing counsel the making of any untrue 
statement by client or witness or any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.273 
 (c) Question witnesses with a purpose and design to elicit 
the whole truth, including particularly supplementary and qualifying 
matters that render evidence already given more accurate, 
 
 273 Cf. Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . .  [t]o make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading[.] 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2004). 
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intelligible, or fair than it otherwise would be. 
(2) In the construction and application of the rules in 
subdivision (1), a lawyer will be held to possess knowledge he actually 
has, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have.274 
AUGUST 1979: INITIAL DRAFT OF THE                                                          
ABA’S MODEL RULES LEAKED TO THE PRESS 
3.2: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL 
In presenting a cause, a lawyer shall be properly candid to the 
tribunal. 
 (a) A lawyer shall not: . . . . 
 (2) Make a knowing misrepresentation of fact; 
 (3) Fail to disclose a fact, even if the fact is adverse, when: 
  (i) Law or the rules of professional conduct require the 
lawyer to disclose the fact; or 
  (ii) Disclosure of the fact is necessary to correct a 
misapprehension resulting from a previous representation the lawyer 
has made to the court; or 
  (iii) Disclosure of the fact would probably have a 
substantial effect on the determination of a material issue of fact, 
except [in criminal defense context]. 
 
 274 From Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1031 (1975).  The ABA disciplinary rules he was proposing to supplement or 
displace, MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102, provided: 
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
. . . . 
 
 (3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is 
required by law to reveal. 
 (4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence. 
 (5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact. 
 (6) Participate in the creation of evidence when he knows or it 
is obvious that the evidence is false. 
 (7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows 
to be illegal or fraudulent. 
 . . . . 
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: 
 (1) His client has, in the course of the representation, 
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon 
his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do 
so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal . . . . 
 (2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon 
a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal. 
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 (4) [except in context of criminal defense], offer evidence 
that the lawyer knows beyond a reasonable doubt to be false or 
fabricated, or offer without suitable explanation evidence that the 
lawyer knows is substantially misleading.  If a lawyer discovers that 
evidence or testimony that the lawyer has presented is false or 
fabricated, it is the lawyer’s duty to disclose that fact and to take 
suitable measures to rectify the consequences, even if doing so 
requires disclosure of a confidence of the client or disclosure that the 
client is implicated in the falsification or fabrication; 
. . . . 
JANUARY 30, 1980: “DISCUSSION DRAFT” OF THE ABA’S MODEL RULES 
RULE 3.1: CANDOR TOWARD TRIBUNAL 
A lawyer shall be candid toward a tribunal. 
(a) A lawyer shall not: 
. . . . 
 (2) make a knowing misrepresentation of fact; 
 (3) [except in context of criminal defense] offer evidence 
that the lawyer is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt is false, or 
offer without suitable explanation evidence that the lawyer knows is 
substantially misleading; 
. . . . 
(b) [except in context of criminal defense] if a lawyer discovers 
that evidence or testimony presented by the lawyer is false, the lawyer 
shall disclose that fact and take suitable measures to rectify the 
consequences, even if doing so requires disclosure of a confidence of 
the client or disclosure that the client is implicated in the 
falsification. 
. . . . 
(d) [except in context of criminal defense] a lawyer shall 
disclose a fact known to the lawyer, even if the fact is adverse, when 
disclosure: 
 (i) is required by law or the rules of professional conduct; 
or 
 (ii) is necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension 
resulting from a previous representation the lawyer has made to the 
tribunal. 
. . . . 
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MAY 30, 1981: “PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT” OF THE MODEL RULES 
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
 (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal, or fail 
to disclose a fact in circumstances where the failure to make the 
disclosure is the equivalent of the lawyer’s making a material 
misrepresentation; 
 (2) fail to make a disclosure of fact necessary to prevent a 
fraud on the tribunal; 
. . . . 
 (4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a 
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, 
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. 
AUGUST 1983: THE MODEL RULES AS ADOPTED BY THE ABA 
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
 (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
tribunal; 
 (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act 
by the client; 
. . . . 
 (4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a 
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, 
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. 
. . . . 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 2002 VERSION 
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
 (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail 
to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to 
the tribunal by the lawyer; 
. . . . 
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 (2) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a 
lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has 
offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, 
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. . . . 
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative 
proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is 
engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to 
the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. 
NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1984-2003 VERSION 
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL 
(a) a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
 (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
tribunal; 
 (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting an illegal, criminal or 
fraudulent act by the client; 
. . . . 
 (4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a 
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, 
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures; or 
 (5) fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge 
that the tribunal may tend to be misled by such failure. 
(Emphasis added to show departure from 1983 version of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.) 
 
NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 2004 VERSION 
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL 
(a) a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
 (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
tribunal; 
 (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting an illegal, criminal or 
fraudulent act by the client; 
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. . . . 
 (4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a 
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, 
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures; or 
 (5) fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact knowing that the 
omission is reasonably certain to mislead the tribunal, except that it shall not 
be a breach of this rule if the disclosure is protected by a recognized privilege or 
is otherwise prohibited by law. 
(Emphasis added to show departure from 1984 version of the 
New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct.) 
 
